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In this study, a pathway through which low socioeconomic status (SES) might heighten 
risk for disorders of mood and affect via a social information-processing bias is investigated. 
Here, we examined whether measures of social status covary with attentional bias toward threat 
and with greater threat-related amygdala reactivity in a sample of healthy community volunteers. 
Participants were middle-aged men and women (30 – 55, M = 42.1 years; 41% female, 87% 
white) who participated in the second Adult Health and Behavior project (AHAB II). SES 
indices included objective (individuals’ education and income, parental education) and 
subjective (individuals rated themselves and their parents on the MacArthur Scale of Subjective 
Social Status) indicators. Participants’ attentional bias toward threat was assessed using a visual 
probe-detection task, utilizing angry, fearful, happy, and neutral facial expressions from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces stimulus set. Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was employed to investigate amygdala reactivity, 
using facial stimuli derived from the MacArthur Network Face stimulus set. Correlational 
analyses failed to show any relationship between SES and attentional bias for any of the affective 
stimuli. Linear regression analyses accounting for age, race, and sex showed lower education (β 
= -.116, SE = .056, p = .041) and lower composite SES (fear > shapes: β = -.142, SE = .059, p = 
.018; fear > neutral: β = -.122, SE = .058, p = .037) associated with higher left amygdala 
reactivity to fearful facial stimuli. No significant relationships between SES and amygdala 
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reactivity were detected for the remaining SES indicators, and findings were limited only to the 
left amygdala relationship with fearful faces.  Thus, our prediction of an inverse association 
between indices of social standing and heightened responses to threatening stimuli was largely 
unsupported by the results. Future investigations should include participants representing a 
broader range of age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic standing in order to more accurately 
characterize individuals’ responses to threat. Despite the shortcomings of the current study, these 
findings provide initial (albeit limited) evidence that heightened neurobiological responses to 
threat may be associated with lower SES. 
 v 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Inequalities of income, education, and other socioeconomic indicators predict diverse sources of 
psychiatric and physical morbidity. In addition to having a powerful influence on physical health 
(Adler et al., 1994), socioeconomic status (SES) is inversely associated with the experience of 
negative emotions and with the occurrence of emotional disorders (Gallo & Matthews, 2003; 
Lorant et al., 2003). Recent national estimates indicate that the most common mental disorders in 
the U.S. are those of anxiety and depression, with 18.1% and 6.7%, respectively, of adults 
suffering from anxiety disorders and major depression during a twelve-month period (Kessler et 
al., 2005). Depressive symptoms (Berkman et al., 1986; Craig & Van Natta, 1979; Fiscella & 
Franks, 1997; Ickovics, Viscoli, & Horowitz, 1997; Kaplan et al, 1987; Lynch, Kaplan, & 
Salonen, 1997; Salokangas & Putanen, 1998; Steele, 1978; Warheit, Holzer, & Arey, 1975) and 
prevalence of depressive disorders (Bruce, Takeuchi, & Leaf, 1991; Kessler et al., 1994) are 
related to low SES, and a similar relationship has been demonstrated for anxiety symptoms 
(Himmelfarb & Murrell, 1984; Weirheit, Bell, Schwab, & Buhl, 1986) and disorders (Blazer et 
al., 1991; Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996; Wittchen et al., 1994), 
including panic and phobic disorders (Regier, et al., 1990; Kessler et al., 1994; Offord et al., 
1994). Lower SES individuals report more emotional distress than do their higher SES 
counterparts (Brown, Bhrol-Chain, & Harris, 1975; Kessler & Cleary, 1980; McLoed & Kessler, 
1990; Turner & Noh, 1983). The life experiences engendered by low SES may lead to higher 
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levels and more frequent experiences of negative emotional states and moods. Negative 
emotionality, itself, is associated with a reduced quality of life, as well as losses in workplace 
productivity (Conti & Burton, 1994; Druss, Rosenheck, & Sledge, 2000; Kessler et al., 1994; 
Murray & Lopez, 1997). Disorders of affect are also posited to play a role in risk for early death 
and disability (Adler et al., 1994; Kaplan & Keil, 1993; Matthews, 1989; Taylor, Repetti, & 
Seeman, 1997).   
In sum, negative affect appears to follow an SES gradient, with lower SES being 
associated with a higher prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders and symptoms (Gallo & 
Matthews, 2003). Here, a pathway through which low SES may heighten risk for disorders of 
mood and affect via a social information-processing bias is proposed. First, though, a conceptual 
basis for SES research is presented, followed by more detailed discussion of covarying 
socioeconomic circumstances and disorders of negative emotion. Next, a possible mechanism for 
this relationship, involving social information processing, is reviewed along with the role of the 
amygdala in processing social information. A model suggesting how each of these components 
might contribute to higher risk of mood disorders among persons of lower SES is presented. 
Finally, we explore whether variations in social information-processing and amygdala reactivity 
are associated with SES in a sample of healthy community volunteers, and whether these 
variations relate to measures of negative emotion. 
1.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Socioeconomic status (SES) has been defined as one’s relative “position” in society, as reflected 
in access to or the accumulation of material resources or prestige (Lynch & Kaplan, 2000). 
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Measures of socioeconomic position indicate particular structural locations within society 
(Lynch & Kaplan, 2000) and attempt to quantify an individual’s probability of success, i.e. “life 
chances”. Current conceptualization of socioeconomic status relies heavily on the concept of 
social class as described in Marxist, Weberian and Functionalist sociological traditions 
(summarized by Lynch & Kaplan, 2000). Social class refers to groups defined by interdependent 
economic and legal relationships, based on an individual’s position within the economy (Krieger, 
Williams & Moss, 1997). Relationships between classes co-define each other, and are 
determined by a society’s connections through production, consumption and distribution of 
goods (Krieger, Williams & Moss, 1997). Conceptualizing class as a social relationship 
emphasizes how members of different social classes advance their economic and social well-
being, and how the well-being of one class is linked to the deprivation of another (Krieger, 
Williams & Moss, 1997). Measures of social class attempt to capture these economic interactions 
among people, rather than identify the personal characteristics that determine an individual’s 
position within a hierarchy. 
Each sociological tradition approaches social class in a slightly different way. The 
Marxian definition of social class reflects stratification in relation to means of production. A 
social class is a group within a society where members are relatively similar in political, 
economic, educational, occupational, and prestige status (Lynch & Kaplan, 2000). According to 
the Weberian tradition, one's class position yields certain probabilities (or life-chances) of 
success. Society is stratified by class, status, and political power, and a lack of resources (i.e. 
goods, skills) places certain individuals at competitive disadvantage. The functionalist approach 
to stratification suggests that complex societies require stratification into sectors that are more or 
less valuable to social maintenance and progress. This position maintains that social inequality is 
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necessitated by the need to preferentially reward, by money and power, individuals best qualified 
to occupy the positions of highest responsibility (Lynch & Kaplan, 2000). The sociological 
schools of thought described here maintain that macrosocial processes determine the 
socioeconomic prospects of individuals, with prevailing political and economic conditions 
generating hierarchies of social position. 
The term social class refers strictly to social groups arising from interdependent 
economic relationships (i.e. “working class”, “managerial class”). For example, epidemiological 
research in many European countries draws upon social class data based on the Registrar-
General’s grouping of occupations, and categorizes individuals’ structural location within the 
economy (Marmot, Kogevinas & Elston, 1987). Because social status in this sense is 
conceptualized as an ordinal variable, it cannot provide a meaningful measure of distance 
between adjacent occupational categories. Although the concept of socioeconomic status (SES) 
has built upon the concept of social class described in the sociological traditions of Marx, Weber, 
and the Functionalists, much contemporary research on social stratification addresses the 
hierarchical positioning of individuals inferred from a combination of measures of resources 
(income, wealth, assets) and prestige (attributed statuses) providing a more continuous measure 
of one’s standing in a social structure (Krieger, Williams, & Moss, 1997)   
Methodologically, SES is commonly assessed at the level of the individual, although 
household and neighborhood-level indicators are also prevalent in contemporary literature. These 
SES indicators are related, but not fully overlapping, and they may conceivably affect health and 
well-being through different pathways (Gallo & Matthews, 2000). The most widely reported 
measures of SES are educational attainment, occupational status, income, or some combination 
of these measures. Although less extensively studied than income, education, or other 
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“objective” socioeconomic indicators, individuals’ perceptions of their relative social positions 
(often measured using a visual social ladder and termed subjective SES) have been found to 
predict various indices of physical and psychological morbidity (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, 
Ickovics, 2000).  
In sum, the intellectual traditions of Marx, Weber and the Functionalists provide a 
framework for research into social inequalities, and describe structural positions within society 
that can be measured in several ways. The concept of relative (subjective) social position also 
provides a new way of conceptualizing and measuring social status. Next, the evidence for a 
social gradient in disorders of negative mood and affect is reviewed, and the influence of 
stressful life events is discussed. 
1.2 SES AND MOOD/AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 
A consistent, inverse relationship between SES and overall rates of psychopathology has been 
documented over several decades of epidemiological research (Kohn, Dohrenwend, & 
Mirotznik, 1998).  In their early review of social status and psychiatric disorders, Dohrenwend 
and Dohrenwend (1974) reported that 28 of 33 studies reviewed showed the highest rates of 
psychopathology in the lowest social stratum represented in the study sample. Similarly, a 
review of 20 investigations found that in 17 studies, the prevalence of psychopathology was 
highest among persons of the lowest compared to the highest social standing, and that across all 
studies, mental disorders were 2.6 times more prevalent among low SES (versus high SES) 
individuals (Neugebauer et al., 1980). More recently, investigations based on the Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area (ECA) study have found significantly higher rates of all disorders in the lowest 
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stratum of SES (Regier et al., 1993; Williams, Takeuchi, & Adair, 1992). Here, we focus on the 
relationships between social status and two specific categories of major psychiatric disorder: 
depression and anxiety. 
Major depressive disorder is characterized by the presence of depressed mood and/or a 
lack of interest or pleasure in most activities for at least 2 weeks, plus at least four additional 
symptoms, which include: change in appetite or weight, alterations in sleeping habits, fatigue, 
psychomotor retardation or agitation, thoughts of guilt or worthlessness, concentration 
difficulties, and suicidal ideation or intent (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). Other clinical depressive diagnoses include depressive symptoms that do not fully meet 
criteria for major depression, dysthymia (sub-threshold depressive symptoms that persist for 2 or 
more years) and minor depression. Over a 1-month period, approximately 5% of the U.S. 
population experiences a major depressive episode (Blazer, Kessler, McGonagle, & Swartz, 
1994), and lifetime prevalence is approximately 13% (Kessler et al., 1994). Lifetime prevalence 
of dysthymia has been estimated at 5% (Kessler et al., 1994), and lifetime prevalence of sub-
threshold depressive symptoms is approximately 23% (Horwath, Johnson, Klerman, & 
Weissman, 1992). Anxiety is characterized by fear or worry regarding future events or the 
memory of past events, though anxiety diagnoses differ in specific symptoms and situational 
stimuli (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Diagnostic criteria for 
generalized anxiety disorder include excessive, uncontrollable worry for at least 6 months, plus 
three additional symptoms including restlessness, fatigue, difficulty thinking or concentrating, 
irritability, muscle tension, and difficulty sleeping. Panic disorder involves recurrent attacks of 
sudden intense fear that occur without an identifiable cause and that are accompanied by somatic 
(e.g., increased heart rate, shortness of breath, sweating) and cognitive symptoms (e.g., fear of 
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losing control or dying). Agoraphobia involves the avoidance of environments that may trigger a 
panic attack, such as refusal to drive or leave one's house, and may occur in association with 
panic disorder. In a 1-year period, approximately 0.9% of the population meets criteria for panic 
disorder, whereas about 9.7% meet criteria for any phobia (Eaton, Dryman, & Weissman, 1991).  
Investigations of socioeconomic predictors of depression have analyzed depressive 
symptoms and clinical depressive diagnoses, and typically use either well-validated structured 
interview assessments, such as the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (Robins, Helzer, Croughan, & 
Ratcliff, 1981) or the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS; Endicott & 
Spitzer, 1979), or well-validated symptom measures including the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck & Beamesderfer, 1974) or the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977), though some of this research has relied on study-specific measures, 
sometimes composed of one or only a few questions. Much of the data documenting association 
of SES with affective disorders has been collected as a component of the Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area (ECA; Robins & Regier, 1991) and National Comorbidity Studies (NCS; 
Kessler et al., 1994), which involved the administration of structured psychiatric interviews to 
large probability samples of U.S. residents (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). 
Cross-sectional evidence documents a higher prevalence of common mental disorders 
among lower socio-economic groups (Holzer et al, 1986; Bijl et al, 1998; Davey Smith, Hart, 
Blane, & Hole,  1998; Lewis et al, 1998; Muntaner et al, 1998; Weich & Lewis, 1998a). 
Longitudinal data suggest that low social status may be a risk factor for the development of 
depressive episodes (Bruce et al., 1991; Kaplan et al, 1987) and that lower SES individuals have 
a worse prognosis for depression (Weich & Lewis, 1998b). A recent meta-analysis demonstrated 
an increased likelihood (odds ratio = 1.81) of depression in the lowest versus the highest tertile 
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of SES (Lorant et al, 2003). More specifically, 51 of the 56 studies exhibited odds ratios greater 
than 1.0 (ranging from 1.09 to 7.98), 35 of which reached statistical significance. In their review 
of studies examining the association between depression and SES, Gallo and Matthews (2003) 
identified nine cross-sectional investigations between depressive symptoms and SES. Of the five 
that examined education and social standing, two identified an inverse, linear association 
between depressive symptoms and SES indices (Lynch, Kaplan, & Salonen, 1997; Salokangas & 
Putanen, 1998). Four studies examined the relationship between income and depression. Fiscella 
and Franks (1997) found that the odds of reporting depressive symptoms were 1.6 – 2.0 times 
higher in low income (versus high income) groups, and similar inverse associations between 
income and depression were noted in two of the three remaining studies (Salokangas & Putanen, 
1998; West, Reed, & Gildengorin, 1998). Only one identified study utilized occupation as the 
index of SES, and showed an inverse relation between occupational prestige and depressive 
symptoms (Lynch, Kaplan, & Salonen, 1997). Of four studies employing composite SES indices, 
three found a significant, inverse association (Ickovics et al., 1997; Steele, 1978; Warheit, 
Holzer, & Arey, 1975). Overall, 64% of the examined associations suggested an inverse 
relationship between SES and depressive symptoms, with depressive symptoms increasing 
linearly across gradations of declining SES. 
 Kessler et al. (1994) found an inverse association of education and income with 
prevalence of major depression in the NCS. A decade later, data from the National Comorbidity 
Survey Replication (NCS-R) yielded similar results, demonstrating that the 12-month prevalence 
of major depressive disorder was significantly elevated in those in the lowest versus the highest 
quartiles of education (OR = 1.9; 0-11 years vs. ≥ 16 years) and income (OR = 3.8; below 
poverty vs. 6 x poverty level) (Kessler & Merikangas, 2003). Kaplan, Roberts, Camacho, and 
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Coyne (1987) observed a prospective relationship of education and income with depressive 
symptoms in a nine-year follow-up of almost 7,000 residents of Alameda County, California. 
Unemployment at baseline (Anthony & Petronis, 1991) and lower education (Gallo, Royall, & 
Anthony, 1993) predicted the onset of major depression at one year follow-up of ECA 
participants, and another prospective analysis of ECA subjects demonstrated that individuals 
reporting poverty-level income had higher rates of incident major depression across a six month 
follow-up (Bruce, Takeuchi, & Leaf, 1991).  
In sum, substantial evidence suggests that individuals of low SES have higher levels of 
depressive symptoms and depressive disorders. The evidence is strongest for a cross-sectional 
association between depressive symptoms and SES and between incident depressive disorders 
and SES, although studies also suggest that SES is associated with prevalent depressive 
disorders.  
Accumulating data also suggest an inverse, linear association for social standing and 
anxiety symptoms and disorders. NCS investigations have identified an inverse association of 
education with panic (Eaton, Kessler, Wittchen, & Magee, 1994) and phobic disorders (Magee et 
al., 1996). Shear et al. (2006) found that respondents with low education (quartiles were 0–11, 
12, 13–15, and 16+ years) were substantially more likely to have anxiety disorders (OR = 2.3) as 
compared to those in the highest quartile of education. Kessler et al. (1994) found that those in 
the lowest income quartile were twice as likely to meet criteria for an anxiety disorder as 
compared to those in the highest income group, and similar associations between income and 
prevalence of various anxiety disorders have been demonstrated in other NCS studies (Magee et 
al., 1996; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994). 
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 The ECA identified mixed evidence for an association between education and prevalent 
panic and phobic disorders (Eaton, Dryman, & Weissman, 1991) and no evidence for a 
relationship between education and generalized anxiety disorder (Blazer, Hughes, George, 
Swartz, & Boyer, 1991). A positive association between financial dependence on the government 
and one-year prevalence rates of generalized anxiety disorders (Blazer et al., 1991) and phobic 
and panic disorders (Eaton et al., 1991) was identified via data from the ECA. Similarly, Regier 
et al. (1993) found a significant association between a composite index of SES and one-month 
prevalence of panic and phobic disorders (OR = 2.43 for lowest quartile of composite SES versus 
highest quartile). Thus, the majority of studies document inverse associations between indicators 
of SES and prevalent anxiety disorders. Regarding incident anxiety disorders, poverty did not 
significantly predict incident panic or phobic disorders in the ECA (Bruce et al., 1991), though 
higher occupational prestige and more education were negatively associated with the one-year 
incidence of agoraphobia (Eaton & Keyl, 1990) and a lower likelihood of incident panic disorder 
(OR = 0.80, Keyl & Eaton, 1990). Wells, Tien, Garrison, and Eaton (1994) found that lower 
education was associated with higher incidence rates of social phobia over a one-year follow-up 
of ECA participants. Murphy and colleagues (1991) incorporated an assessment of anxiety 
disorders in their longitudinal study of SES and psychiatric status and found that SES did not 
show a clear association with incident anxiety disorders. Thus, evidence supports an association 
between lower levels of SES and higher levels of anxiety symptoms and prevalent anxiety 
disorders. 
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1.3 MECHANISMS 
As reviewed in the preceding section, a growing body of literature suggests an association 
between SES and negative emotions. To the extent that social inequalities may play a causal role 
in these psychopathologies, the mechanisms mediating such associations remain uncertain. 
Although various pathways, such as genetic influences, environmental toxins, or a lack of mental 
health services are likely to be important, emotional correlates of SES are emphasized in the 
present discussion. 
Substantial evidence supports a role for “social causation” in linking SES with negative 
cognitive-emotional factors (Gallo & Matthews, 2003), whereby it is hypothesized that 
heightened exposure to environmental adversity elevates risk of emotional disorders in lower 
SES groups (Dohrenwend, 2000; Kendler et al., 1995). Specifically, lower SES individuals 
experience more frequent stressful life events, such as income loss, ill health, and death of a 
loved one (Anderson & Armstead, 1995; Dohrenwend, 1973; McLeod & Kessler, 1990). 
Inhabitants of lower SES neighborhoods are more likely to report concerns regarding crime, 
pollution, and crowding (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996; Evans, 2001; Homel & Burns, 1987) and 
low income persons are more likely to be exposed to toxic wastes and other forms of threatening 
environmental conditions, relative to more affluent citizens (Environmental Protection Agency, 
1977; Institute of Medicine, 1999). Low SES families experience more threatening and 
uncontrollable life events, such as family destabilization, violence, unstable employment, and 
persistent economic hardship (Bradley & Whiteside-Mansell, 1997; Gad & Johnson, 1980). 
Adolescents from lower SES families are more likely to perceive their neighborhood as 
dangerous and violent (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996) and to report the presence of weapons and 
fighting at school than their higher SES counterparts (Gallup, 1993; Sinclair et al., 1994). 
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Children living in poorer neighborhoods are more likely to witness street violence (Fitzpatrick & 
Boldizar, 1993). These adverse events have also been implicated in the onset and severity of 
depression (Kendler et al., 1993; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Kessler, 1997; 
Lewinsohn, Hoberman, & Rosenbaum, 1988; Stueve, Dohrenwend, & Skodol, 1998) and anxiety 
disorders (Blazer, Hughes, & George, 1987; Epstein, Fullerton & Ursano, 1998; Findlay-Jones & 
Brown, 1981; Joy, Probert, Bisson & Shepherd, 2000; Maes, Mylle, Delmeire & Janca, 2001). 
An additional socio-environmental contributor to higher prevalence of emotional 
disorders in lower SES individuals may be the distress stemming from perceptions of relative 
social or material disadvantage (Gianaros et al., 2007; Gallo & Matthews, 2003; Adler & Snibbe, 
2003; Wilkinson, 1999). Growing evidence suggests that perception of economic deprivation or 
lower social standing in relation to others is associated with poorer mental health (Marmot & 
Wilkinson, 1999; Wilkinson, 1999). Epidemiologic evidence demonstrates that less egalitarian 
societies have higher rates of violence and lower quality of social relations (Wilkinson, 1999). 
Limited educational and occupational opportunities, along with less access to material resources, 
may engender perceptions of powerlessness, social exclusion, or disenfranchisement among 
those in lower social strata. In combination with a diminished sense of personal control, 
awareness of negative status-based stereotypes may heighten perceptions of discrimination in 
those with relatively lower educational, financial, or occupational status. Although most research 
on perceived discrimination has focused on racial categorization, status-based stereotypes have 
been documented (Feldman & Hilterman, 1974; Weeks & Lupfer, 2004) and have, in some 
cases, shown stronger bias effects than have racial stereotypes (Jussim, Coleman, & Lurch, 
1987). Negative attitudes and beliefs regarding lower SES groups include perceptions of low 
SES individuals as lazy (Leahy, 1981), dishonest (Desmond, Price, Eoff, 1989) and uninterested 
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in education (Bullock, 1999). Though few studies have investigated perceptions of SES-based 
prejudice, evidence for perceived mistreatment based on income level has been documented 
(Brown et al., 2006; Guyll et al., 2001; Matthews et al., 2005). In medical settings, low SES 
patients report higher rates of being discriminated against by health care providers, independent 
of race (Trivedi & Ayanian, 2006).  
The frequency and intensity of exposure to harmful or potentially threatening situations 
may be crucial in the association of lower SES with negative emotions. Potentially, more 
frequent exposure to adverse life events, as well as perceptions of relative disadvantage, may 
heighten psychological distress among lower SES individuals and render them more vulnerable 
to negative affective states and mood disorders. This heightened exposure to stressful situations 
may serve to “sensitize” lower SES persons to these potential threats over time, whereby these 
individuals come to attend more readily to cues of possible danger. Living in a low-SES 
environment over a prolonged period of time has been suggested to lead a state of ‘reactive 
responding,’ characterized, in part, by chronic vigilance for threatening environmental stimuli 
(Taylor & Seeman, 1999), and others have reported associations between lower SES and higher 
“vigilance for threat” (Feldman & Steptoe, 2004).  
These cognitive tendencies may, in turn, increase one’s vulnerability for disorders of 
negative affect. Maladaptive cognitions related to information-processing have been 
hypothesized to play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of emotional disorders 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Specifically, ruminative processing of thoughts related to the threat of 
loss or failure has been implicated in depressive disorders (Beck, 1987), while selective attention 
to danger-related information may enhance anxious tendencies (Eysenck, 1992). Individuals with 
such a vigilant attentional style may exhibit heightened sensitivity to potential dangers in the 
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environment, which, in turn, could negatively impact mood (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 
1998).  
Thus far, we have conceptualized SES as playing a causal role in the development of 
disorders of negative affect. In contrast, some evidence supports an alternate “social selection” 
hypothesis, wherein negative emotions and cognitions might reduce one’s likelihood of attaining 
or maintaining a higher social position. For example, National Comorbidity Survey respondents 
with early-life anxiety and mood disorders, independent of childhood SES, were significantly 
more likely to drop out of high school (OR’s 1.4 – 1.6) as compared to those with no history of 
childhood psychiatric disorder (Kessler, Foster, & Stang, 1995). Others suggest that social 
causation and selection are not mutually exclusive explanations of the association between SES 
and psychiatric disorders, and may operate at different points across the life cycle (Dohrenwend 
et al., 1992; Lorant et al., 2003). The majority of findings, however, suggest that the social drift 
hypothesis is more relevant for debilitating psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Dohrenwend, 1990) and substance use disorders (Kessler et al., 1995) whereas social causation 
processes play a more important role in the association between SES and depression and anxiety 
(Johnson et al., 1999). For instance, Johnson and colleagues (1999) showed childhood SES to be 
a strong prospective predictor of future depressive and anxiety disorders, while neither 
depression nor anxiety predicted downward shifts in SES in a sample of over 700 children. 
Another longitudinal study of adolescents found no evidence of downward shift in SES for 
participants with baseline diagnoses of anxiety or depression (Miech, Caspi, Moffitt, Wright, & 
Silva, 1999). Thus, although the origins of the association between SES and negative affect may 
not be clear cut, the data suggest a stronger causal role for SES-based social stressors in this 
relationship. 
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1.4 SENSITIVITY TO THREAT 
Historically, threat appraisals have been investigated in a variety of clinical anxiety disorders 
(e.g., GAD, PTSD, social phobia, simple phobias, OCD, panic disorder) and a substantial body 
of literature documents selective attention to threat signals among clinically anxious and high 
anxious individuals (see reviews by Bar-Haim et al., 2007 and Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997). Although the evidence for an attentional bias is less robust in depressed 
individuals, depression has been associated with selective processing of negative information 
(Teasdale, 1983) and the tendency to expect negative outcomes (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). 
Cognitive models postulate that individuals higher in negative affect prioritize threat stimuli over 
neutral or positive information, and that this vigilance for threat might result in greater 
generalized sensitivity for negative information. 
A variety of tasks have been used to identify biases in selective attention to emotional 
stimuli. When subjects are asked to choose between spoken homophones (differently spelled 
words with identical sounds), trait anxious individuals tend to write down the threatening 
alternative (e.g., “die” versus “dye”) (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987). Trait anxious 
individuals show a bias toward expectation of negative events when asked to predict sentence 
conclusions (Calvo & Costillo, 2001) and social phobics manifest biases in recall and recognition 
of negative faces (Foa et al., 2000; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Richards et al., 2002). Muris, 
Luermans, Merckelbach, and Mayer (2000) demonstrated that, when exposed to both threatening 
and ambiguous social scenarios, children’s anxious and depressive symptoms were positively 
associated with frequency of threat perception and early detection of threat.  
In the Modified (Emotional) Stroop color-naming task, participants are asked to name the 
colors in which words are printed as quickly as possible while disregarding word meaning. 
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Color-naming latency has been interpreted as reflecting the extent to which processing resources 
are allocated to the word content (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Compared to normal controls, 
individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) typically take longer to name the colors 
of threatening words than to name neutral words (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, 
& Weinman, 1989), and similar effects are seen in patients with panic disorder (Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; McNally Riemann, & Kim, 1990). Combat veterans (McNally, 
Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990) and rape victims (Cassiday, McNally & Zeitlin, 1992) with 
PTSD show slowed color naming with trauma-relevant words, relative to trauma victims without 
PTSD. Emotional Stroop effects have also been found in non-clinical samples of trait anxious 
individuals, who demonstrate slowed naming of anxiety related words when in anxious states 
(Richards & French, 1992; Egloff & Hock, 2001). In addition to anxious populations, 
interference effects during color-naming emotional words have been documented in depressed 
individuals (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Williams & Nulty, 1986), although a 
bias for negative words has typically been found only if the stimuli are presented for 1000 ms or 
longer (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Mogg et al. 1995; Bradley & Whiteside-Mansell, 1997; Gotlib et 
al., 2004;  Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004). Segal et al. (1995) found an 
attentional bias for negative self-descriptions (participant-selected) in depressed participants, 
though the target words were presented for a relatively long duration (2 s). By contrast, 
attentional biases have typically not been found in clinical depression when negative words were 
shown for relatively short display times in the modified Stroop task (Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, 
Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1997; Mogg et al., 1993). 
Numerous studies have investigated the role of selective attention to threat using a visual 
probe-detection task (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), commonly referred to as the “dot-
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probe task”. In the dot-probe task, two words, facial expressions or pictures (one emotionally 
valenced and one neutral) are simultaneously presented to participants in different locations on a 
computer monitor (top versus bottom/left versus right), after which a neutral object (the ‘probe’) 
appears in the space previously occupied by one of the two stimuli (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & 
Neufeld, 2008).  
Participants are instructed to press a response button immediately upon perceiving the probe, and 
response latencies on the dot-probe task are held to provide a “snapshot” of the distribution of 
participants’ attention, with faster responses to probes presented in the attended relative to the 
unattended location (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004).  In the dot-probe 
paradigm, participants are required to respond to a neutral stimulus (the probe), alleviating 
concern that delayed latencies may result from response bias or general arousal.  
Consistent evidence has shown that anxious individuals respond faster to congruent trials 
(probe in place of threatening stimulus) than to incongruent trials (probe in place of neutral 
stimulus) (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; 
Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Horenstein & Segui, 1997; Kroeze & van den Hout, 2000), a 
finding which is interpreted as vigilance for threat (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). For instance, individuals with GAD are faster to respond to probes that replace 
threat words than neutral words, in comparison with normal controls (MacLeod et al., 1986). In a 
study of non-clinical individuals, MacLeod and Mathews (1988) found that high trait anxious 
students responded more quickly to threatening words than did their low trait anxious 
counterparts. Koster and colleagues found that subjects’ selective attention for high threat 
pictures increased with higher trait anxiety scores on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (r 
= 0.42, p < 0.01) (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). A meta-analysis by Bar-
 18 
Haim et al. (2007), investigating the overall effect size of the attentional bias in anxiety in 172 
studies (2,263 anxious and 1,768 nonanxious individuals), found that the combined effect size of 
the threat-related bias was significant in anxious participants (d = 0.45) and nonsignificant in 
nonanxious controls. The authors reported the attentional bias to be reliable across different 
experimental paradigms and of comparable magnitude across different types of anxious 
populations (individuals with different clinical disorders, high-anxious nonclinical individuals, 
anxious children and adults). 
 Depression has also been associated with selective processing of negative information 
(Teasdale, 1983) and the tendency to expect negative outcomes (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). 
Although the evidence for an attentional bias is less robust in depression, some investigations 
using the dot-probe paradigm support an attentional bias for threat-related stimuli in depressed 
individuals. Using relatively long durations of stimulus presentation [500 – 1000 milliseconds 
(ms)], Mogg, Bradley, & Williams (1995) found an attentional bias toward negative words, and 
Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson (1996) demonstrated the bias for socially threatening words 
(e.g. “shame”, “loser”, “stupid”).  No attentional bias has been found in clinically depressed 
individuals when the stimuli have been masked to restrict awareness (Bradley et al., 1995; 
Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1993, 1995). Thus, while attention to negatively valenced 
emotional stimuli may exist in both anxiety and depression, the nature and time course of 
attentional responses may vary.  
The issue of stimulus presentation time highlights some limitations introduced by the 
“snapshot” view attention provided by the dot probe. Attentional bias to threat has been 
examined in conditions that prevented conscious perception (typically 100 – 200 ms) as well as 
in conditions that allowed clear awareness (500 ms or longer) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The issue 
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of stimulus presentation time (i.e. supraliminal versus subliminal processing) is critical, 
considering that varying presentation times may yield different results. Longer asynchronies 
between stimulus onset and probe presentation across studies allow for multiple fixations of 
attention during the task, making it unclear which components of attention are responsible for the 
differences in response times (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008).  For instance, one critical 
debate surrounds the question of whether faster responses on congruent dot probe trials result 
from accelerated engagement with the threat stimulus or from a difficulty to disengage from the 
threat. Evidence demonstrates that evaluation of emotional stimuli may occur in the absence of 
awareness (e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Öhman, 1993), leading some authors to propose that anxious 
individuals direct their attention toward threatening information during early, automatic stages of 
processing (Williams et al., 1988). In this scenario, abnormalities in the threat-detection 
mechanism of anxious individuals would result in a hypervigilant mode toward threat. In 
contrast, others suggest that inhibition of processing of threatening information is the core deficit 
in anxiety, which is reflected in avoidance of threatening stimuli (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Mogg, 
Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997), resulting in threat-related biases in anxiety being confined 
to later stages of processing. Attempts to reconcile these conflicting views of attentional biases 
suggest that anxious individuals direct their attention toward threat during early, automatic 
stages of processing, and direct attention away from threat during later stages of processing 
(Williams et al., 1997, 1988; Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Mogg et al., 1997) while others cite the 
delay in disengagement from threat stimuli as the primary attentional difference between anxious 
and nonanxious individuals (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Some investigators have addressed the problem by obtaining a more 
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continuous measure of attention by assessing the direction and latency of eye movements to the 
emotional stimuli (Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000).  
Despite some of the drawbacks related to the dot probe task, the literature generally 
supports an association between variation in attentional bias for threat and negative affectivity. 
Low SES, by virtue of its association with chronically stressful and threatening environments, 
may be associated with variations in processing of threat-related information, and this cognitive 
correlate of SES could conceivably mediate SES associations with mood and anxiety disorders. 
Further research into the neural bases of selective attention to threat, discussed below, has 
implicated the amygdala as playing a central role in threat-related emotional processes. 
 
1.5 THE AMYGDALA 
Increased responsiveness to social threat, as reflected in individuals’ tendencies to selective 
attention toward threatening visual stimuli, may contribute to disorders of mood and affect. It 
may be useful, then, to understand whether this attentional bias is mediated at the 
neurobiological level via a common emotional information processing mechanism. 
Accumulating data supports a specific role for the amygdala in the perception of threat-related 
stimuli in humans (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006). The amygdala has 
been shown to respond to a variety of threatening stimuli, including pictures of physical threats 
(Hariri et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2002) and exposure to facial expressions of fear and anger 
(Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs, 2001; Whalen et al., 1998). The amygdala is a subcortical structure 
with connections to both sensory processing areas and autonomic control centers in the brain, 
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and is thought to underlie both the detection of environmental threat and the accompanying 
autonomic and neuroendocrine responses to threatening stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001). This 
structure is a key component of an integrated functional network, which shares reciprocal 
connections with visual, auditory, somatosensory, olfactory, and taste systems via thalamic and 
prefrontal projections (Amaral et al., 1992; McDonald, 1998; Turner et al., 1980). The amygdala 
influences physiologic responses via indirect projections to various arousal systems, such as the 
basal forebrain cholinergic system, the brainstem cholinergic system, and the locus ceruleus 
noradrenergic system, each of which innervates widespread areas of the cortex (LeDoux, 2000), 
and may exert modulatory influences on the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis via 
direct projections to the hypothalamus (Xu, Day, & Buller, 1999).  Physiologic responses 
initiated by the amygdala may, in turn, influence cortical regions via feedback from 
proprioceptive and/or neuroendocrine signals (Damasio, 1994; McGaugh, Cahill, & Roozendaal, 
1996). 
The amygdala consists of numerous subnuclei (often referred to as the amygdaloid 
complex) that have distinct pathways to and from cortical and brain stem structures that may 
play different roles in information processing and behavior (Whalen, 1998). The regions most 
relevant to the processing of threat stimuli appear to be the lateral, basal, accessory basal, and 
central nuclei (LeDoux, 2000). The central nuclei are thought to play an important role in 
generating fear responses such as increased heart rate, increased respiration, and the release of 
stress-related hormones (LeDoux, 2000). Historically, however, most findings have been at the 
level of the amygdala as a whole, rather than at the level of specific nuclei (LeDoux, 2002), and 
substantial evidence suggests that the subnuclei of the amygdala operate in concert as a 
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functional unit when monitoring the environment (Whalen, 1998), Thus, the amygdala will be 
referred to here as a distinct anatomical structure.  
Functional imaging studies have demonstrated amygdala responsivity to a wide range of 
emotionally salient cues, including facial expressions of sadness (Wang et al., 2005; Yang et al., 
2002), disgust (Adolphs et al., 1999), surprise (Kim et al., 2003), and happiness (Breiter et al., 
1996; Yang et al., 2002). However, evidence suggests that the amygdala is activated more 
strongly in the presence of fearful and angry faces than of happy ones (Breiter et al., 1996), and 
consistent evidence demonstrates a particular sensitivity to threat-related signals (Adolphs, 2002; 
Phan et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2003). Both lesion (Adolphs et al., 1994, 1995; Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001) and neuroimaging studies (Davis & Whalen, 2001) have shown that fearful 
responses to facial expressions are processed and largely mediated by the amygdala. Patients 
with amygdala damage show deficits in the perception of fearful faces (Adolphs et al., 1995; 
Calder et al., 1996) and detection of the emotional tone of voices (Scott et al., 1997). Amygdala 
responses to fearful faces have been observed in the absence of subjects’ conscious awareness, 
with some evidence suggesting that subliminal presentations of fearful faces result in stronger 
amygdala activation than do freely observed stimuli (Whalen et al., 1998).  
Fear is associated with situations that threaten survival, and reacting appropriately to 
fearful stimuli may confer a direct survival advantage (LeDoux, 1996). In humans, facial 
expressions of negative affect are examples of such fearful stimuli, and observation of angry or 
fearful faces elicits strong visceral responses, such as increased heart rate and sweating (Öhman 
& Soares, 1998). The amygdala is especially sensitive to social cues, such as facial expressions 
(Whalen, 1998). Along with greater autonomic arousal, Hariri and colleagues (2002) have 
demonstrated stronger amygdala responses to fearful and threatening facial expressions, as 
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compared to nonface stimuli such as violent scenes. Thus, facial expressions are of critical 
importance in the processing of social and emotional information (Hariri et al., 2002), and facial 
stimuli, as opposed to words or threatening scenes, may represent the most useful tool for 
measuring amygdala reactivity to threat in social environments.  
Based on its key role in the processing of negative facial expressions (Liddell et al., 2005; 
Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998), the amygdala has been implicated in the etiology of 
affective disorders. Exaggerated amygdala reactivity to social threat (e.g., viewing harsh faces) 
has been implicated in social phobia (Phan et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2002; Straube et al., 2004). 
In comparison with control subjects, patients with PTSD have shown amygdala hyper-reactivity 
to threatening facial expressions (Liberzon et al 1999; Rauch et al., 2004; Shin et al., 1997). 
Amygdala reactivity to facial threat signals is greater among subjects scoring higher on measures 
of trait anxiety and neuroticism (Bishop et al., 2004; Canli et al., 2001; Etkin et al., 2004). A 
meta-analysis of 40 fMRI studies, comparing amygdala reactivity to threat-related stimuli of 
anxious participants (suffering from PTSD, social anxiety disorder, and specific phobia) versus 
controls, demonstrated consistent and significant heightened amygdala reactivity among anxiety-
disordered individuals (Etkin & Wager, 2007). In their meta-analysis of studies investigating 
differences in amygdala volume in depressed versus non-depressed individuals, Hamilton, 
Siemer, and Gotlib (2008) found that amygdala volume was significantly lower in unmedicated 
depressed participants than in controls (d = −1.24, p = .01). Amygdala hyperactivity has been 
demonstrated in depressed patients, compared with controls, in response to emotional faces 
(Sheline, Barch, & Donnelly, 2001) and verbal stimuli (Siegle et al., 2002). Depressed 
adolescents demonstrated a significant, positive association between left amygdala activation to 
viewing fearful faces with depression scores (r = 0.46, p = .023) (Yang et al., 2010). In two fMRI 
 24 
studies of depressed patients who completed an affective priming task (outside the scanner), 
subjects rated neutral targets more negatively when they were primed by angry or sad faces, 
compared with neutral targets primed by neutral faces, and these negative bias scores positively 
correlated with amygdala responses to masked angry and sad faces (Dannlowski et al., 2007a; 
Dannlowski et al, 2007b). Thus, strong evidence suggests that amygdala hyperactivity to threat 
may be shared across disorders of negative affect, as documented by variation in responsivity to 
and bias toward potentially aversive stimuli (Yoon et al., 2007). 
1.6 SOCIAL STATUS AND THE AMYGDALA 
It is possible that individuals of lower social status exhibit stronger amygdala responses to 
potential threats, as compared to those of higher SES. As reviewed previously, the heightened 
exposure to unpredictable and stressful events inherent in lower SES environments may lead to 
the development of a “vigilant” cognitive bias. This hypervigilant style may be mediated via the 
amygdala, which is activated by a wide variety of stressful stimuli. Experimental studies of 
rodents show that repeated exposure to stressful stimuli sensitizes many components of the stress 
response, including an increased neuronal activation within the amygdala (Buffalari & Grace, 
2008). Chronic immobilization has been shown to increase spine density of basolateral amygdala 
(BLA) pyramidal neurons (Mitra et al., 2005; Vyas, Mitra, Rao, & Chatterji, 2002), while 
chronic cold exposure heightens the responses of BLA neurons to footshock (Correll et al., 
2005). Buffalari and Grace (2008) demonstrated that, following long-term cold exposure (> 14 
days), BLA neurons in rats exhibited increased sensitivity to novel stressors, as measured by 
electrophysiological response, compared to controls. Vyas et al. (2002) suggest that hormones 
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released as a result of stress-induced amygdala activity strengthen the excitatory drive within the 
amygdala, thereby influencing subsequent information processing by the amygdala and its 
downstream targets. Further, they suggest that, in combination with a gradual stress-induced loss 
of higher-level (i.e. prefrontal cortex, hippocampal) inhibitory control, chronic stress could lead 
to a gain in excitatory control exerted by the amygdala, resulting in an abnormally high fear 
response. Research into the neural pathways involved in emotional processing suggests that 
anxiety disorders may reflect a dysregulation of fear systems of the brain (Eysenck, 1992; 
LeDoux, 1996). It is possible, then, that the chronic stress encountered by lower SES persons 
may lead to an amygdala hypersensitivity to potential dangers and, ultimately, increased 
likelihood of developing an affective disorder. 
 To date, little evidence exists to support an association between neural systems and SES-
related threat sensitivity in humans.  Research suggests that humans infer social dominance from 
aggression-related emotional expressions (Chiao et al., 2008), where facial expressions of anger 
are perceived as dominant and fearful expressions represent submissiveness (Hess, Blairy, & 
Kleck, 2000; Knutson, 1996). Increased amygdala reactivity to threat-related facial expressions 
may represent a neural correlate of conditioning responses to perceived socio-environmental 
threats. By experimentally manipulating social ranking within a perceived hierarchy, Zink and 
colleagues (2008) demonstrated that viewing a superior ranking individual resulted in heightened 
amygdala activity. In another recent fMRI study, Gianaros and colleagues (2008) examined the 
association of amygdala reactivity with facial expressions of negative affect in 33 healthy 
undergraduates, who also provided retrospective rankings of their parents’ social standing as an 
indicator of childhood and adolescent SES. The authors report that college students with lower 
perceived parental social status show greater amygdala reactivity in fMRI to threatening facial 
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expressions (Gianaros et al., 2008), independent of demographic factors, dispositional 
emotionality, and recent depressive and anxious symptoms. In light of the greater exposure to 
violence, crime, conflict, and other adverse conditions experienced by individuals from lower 
SES backgrounds, as well as data showing cell groups in the amygdala to demonstrate marked 
neural plasticity as a function of early life stress (McEwen, 2007), Gianaros et al. (2008) suggest 
that this heightened threat sensitivity may be due to a developmental ‘embedding’ of stressful 
early SES-related experiences.  However, to our knowledge, no investigation has been conducted 
to determine whether these findings are similar in a population of adults’ perceptions of their 
own social status. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
Lower SES individuals experience more frequent stressful life events and are at higher risk of 
mood and anxiety disorders than their higher SES counterparts. Certain cognitive tendencies, 
including a vigilant attentional style, have been associated with negative affectivity, and this 
heightened sensitivity to threat may result from adverse environmental exposures, influencing 
the development of anxiety and mood disorders. Further, the amygdala is recognized as playing a 
crucial role in the processing of threat-related information. Frequent exposure to SES-related 
environmental stressors may result in heightened amygdala sensitivity to potential dangers (also 
reflected in attentional bias toward threat). Hence, amygdala reactivity to threat signals may 
represent a neural correlate of SES-related experiences. Thus, a predisposition toward negative 
affectivity, and to selectively attend toward threatening visual stimuli, may be mediated at the 
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neurobiological level via a common information processing mechanism – specifically, increased 
amygdala responsiveness to social threat (Frewen et al., 2008) (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Potential pathway for SES influences on negative affect, via attentional bias for threat and 
amygdala reactivity. 
1.8 PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
Lower SES individuals are at higher risk of developing disorders of negative emotion.  Despite 
numerous investigations of potential mediators of this relationship, the mechanisms responsible 
for this association remain unclear. One potential pathway for development for these disorders is 
the presence of a social information-processing bias, namely a vigilant attentional style, which 
has been associated with negative affectivity.  This increased sensitivity to threat, also reflected 
in heightened amygdala activation, may be associated with exposure to adverse environmental 
conditions and may, in turn, ultimately influence the development of anxiety and mood 
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disorders. However, little evidence exists to support this assertion. The purpose of the current 
study, then, is to expand this literature by examining whether measures of social status covary 
with sensitivity to threat and greater amygdala reactivity in a population of adult community 
volunteers, and whether the variation in amygdala reactivity mediates the relationship between 
SES and selective attention to threat. The study hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis One: Lower socioeconomic status will be associated with an attentional bias to 
threat, as reflected on a visual probe-detection task.  
 
Hypothesis Two: Lower socioeconomic status will predict greater magnitude of amygdala 
response to visual threat-related stimuli presented during a functional neuroimaging task.  
 
Hypothesis Three: Insofar as the above hypotheses are supported, amygdala reactivity to facial 
expressions of negative emotion will mediate (account for) the effects of low socioeconomic 
status on selective attention to threat. 
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2.0  METHODS 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
This investigation included 127 community volunteers (age range 30 – 55, M = 42.1 years; 41% 
female, 87% white) who participated in the second Adult Health and Behavior project (AHAB 
II). AHAB II is a University of Pittsburgh registry of diverse behavioral and biological 
measurements collected on individuals recruited (by mail solicitation) from communities of 
Southwestern Pennsylvania (principally Allegheny County). This protocol was approved by the 
University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board, and participants provided informed consent. 
Participants were excluded if they were unemployed, or if they reported a history of any of the 
following conditions: myocardial infarction, stroke, or cancer treatment within the past year, 
chronic kidney or liver disease, major neurological disorders, schizophrenia or other psychotic 
illness. Pregnant women were also ineligible. Individuals who reported a fear of enclosed or 
confined spaces, who had tattooed eyeliner, medical devices, implants, or other metal objects in 
or on the body that cannot be removed, or whose body habitus did not permit entry into an MR 
scanner were also excluded. 
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2.2 MEASURES 
2.2.1 Socioeconomic Status 
2.2.1.1 Objective SES Measures 
As reviewed previously, lower SES predicts poorer mental health outcomes whether 
social standing is expressed as level of education, income, or a composite of these measures 
(Eaton, Kessler, Wittchen, & Magee, 1994; Fiscella & Franks, 1997; Gallo, Royall, & Anthony, 
1993; Ickovics et al., 1997; Kaplan, Roberts, Camacho, and Coyne, 1987; Kessler & Merikangas, 
2003; Salokangas & Putanen, 1998; Shear et al., 2006; West et al., 1998; Wittchen, Zhao, 
Kessler, & Eaton, 1994). Individuals’ objective SES was indexed by two conventional 
indicators: 1) cumulative years of schooling; and 2) annual (pre-tax) family income, within 
bracketed ranges of: 1 = < $10,000; 2 = $10,000-14,999; 3 = $15,000-24,999; 4 = $25,000-
34,999; 5 = $35,000-49,999; 6 = $50,000-64,999; 7 = $65,000-79,999; 8 = $80,000-94,999; 9 = 
$95,000-109,999; 10 = $110,000-124,999; 11 = $125,000-139,999; 12 = $140,000-154,999; 13 = 
$155,000-169,999; 14 = $170,000-185,000; 15 = > $185,000. As in prior reports (Manuck et al., 
2005; Matthews, Flory, Muldoon, & Manuck, 2000; Manuck, Phillips, Gianaros, Flory, & 
Muldoon, 2010), a composite measure of objective SES was computed by averaging the 
standardized (z-score) values of the two index variables for each individual.  This measure was 
then re-standardized to yield of a distribution with mean of 0.0 and SD of 1.0. 
Although education and income may influence cognitive and emotional processing 
uniquely at each level of the social “gradient”, the most striking SES effects may be seen in 
individuals at the lowest strata of SES (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010; Noble, McCandliss, 
& Farah, 2007). Thus, we thus we also converted the continuous SES variables (years of 
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education and family income) into dichotomous indicators of lowest education (i.e. no post-
secondary degree) and lowest income (i.e. less than $35,000 per year) versus those of higher 
education and income in the current sample.   
Children from lower SES families typically suffer worse mental health outcomes than do 
children from higher SES families (Chen, Matthews, & Boyce, 2002), and growing evidence 
indicates that lower childhood SES is associated with increased risk of emotional disorders in 
adulthood. Children who experience socioeconomic disadvantage are more likely to develop 
depression or anxiety (Merikangas, 2005; Fombonne, 1995), and adults from lower SES 
backgrounds (i.e. parents were employed in manual occupations) demonstrate a nearly twofold 
increased risk of major depression, independent of adult SES (Gilman, Kawachi, Fitzmaurice, & 
Buka, 2002).  
Considering the potential importance of childhood environment, objective data on 
participant’s childhood SES circumstances was also examined. Participants reported both their 
mothers’ and fathers’ level of education completed by the time the participant was age 18 (range: 
0 = no H.S. diploma, 1 = GED, 2 = H.S. diploma, 3 = Technical training, 4 = Some college, no 
degree, 5 = AS, 6 = BS, 7 = MS, 8 = MD/PhD). 
2.2.1.2 Subjective SES Measures 
A frequently cited correlate of low SES is the stress (or distress) that may be occasioned 
by heightened challenges of daily living, uncertainties of future prospect, or demoralization 
stemming from perceptions of relative social or material disadvantage (Gianaros et al., 2007; 
Gallo & Matthews, 2003; Adler & Snibbe, 2003; Wilkinson, 1999).  In turn, putative stress-
related dimensions of social stratification might be gauged more sensitively by subjective 
estimate than by conventional measures of objective SES. 
 32 
The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, a visual ladder depicting ordered rungs 
of ascending perceived SES (Figure 2), has been shown to predict various indicators of health 
status and risk, including disorders of negative emotion (Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 
2003; Goodman et al., 2001) often over and above conventionally assessed SES.  Work by 
Singh-Manoux and colleagues (2003), in which the authors predicted subjective status using a 
cluster of socioeconomic measures (occupation, education, income), wealth, life satisfaction 
measures, and psychological well being, shows that the combination of education, occupational 
grade, household income, feeling secure, and satisfaction with one’s standard of living accounts 
for substantial variance associated with subjective status. Alternatively (or in addition), 
subjective SES ratings may capture a psychological property of relative social position that 
engenders greater distress or demoralization among persons who perceive themselves as 
disadvantaged relative to others (Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004). However, significant 
associations between ladder rankings and health measures have been demonstrated upon 
adjustment for negative affect (Adler et al, 2000; Operario et al., 2004), and Singh-Manoux et al. 
(2003) demonstrate that individuals primarily reference socioeconomic parameters when 
assigning themselves subjective SES rankings, while potentially biasing personality 
characteristics (such as traits of hopelessness, optimism, or hostility) account for little additional 
variance in subjective SES scores (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). Subjective SES likely reflects a 
“cognitive averaging” of multiple dimensions of socioeconomic circumstances, such as access to 
material resources, earnings and accumulated wealth, educational attainments, occupational 
prestige, and assessments of future prospects (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003), rendering this 
measure potentially a more comprehensive single-index portrayal of individuals’ social position 
than the common socioeconomic indicators employed in most epidemiologic studies. Subjective 
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appraisals, then, may provide a more sensitive gauge of SES-related stress than do more 
traditional SES indices. 
Lower rankings on the MacArthur social ladder have been associated with impaired sleep 
and elevated heart rate (Adler et al., 2000), with an exaggerated rise in the stress-hormone, 
cortisol, on awakening from sleep (Wright & Steptoe, 2005) and with a non-habituating cortisol 
response to acute psychological stress (Adler et al., 2000). In most instances, these associations 
remained significant even when adjusted for correlated variation in objective SES indicators. 
Recently, in an fMRI investigation of 100 healthy community volunteers, lower subjective SES, 
independent of conventional SES measures, was found to correlate with reduced gray matter 
volume in the perigenual area of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain region involved in 
emotional experience and the regulation of behavioral and physiological reactivity to stress 
(Gianaros et al., 2007). These findings suggest that subjective SES might contribute to 
psychiatric morbidity, in part, through neurobiologic correlates of the stress associated with 
lower perceived social standing. Volumetric changes in the ACC and other paralimbic brain 
areas have been documented in stress-related psychiatric symptomatology, such as depression 
(e.g., Drevets, Öngür, & Price, 1998), which is also predicted by low subjective status (Goodman 
et al., 2001; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). Of potential relevance to the current study, 
neurobiologic correlates of subjective SES may modulate key circuitries of social information 
processing involved in the development of affective disorders.  
Participants’ individual subjective SES was assessed by asking individuals to rank 
themselves on the MacArthur ladder (comparison of standing compared to others in the United 
States; 1 = worst off to 10 = best off). Participants also used this “social ladder” to rank their 
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perceptions of each parent’s SES during the participants’ childhood and adolescence (in 
comparison to others within the United States) prior to the participants’ eighteenth birthday. 
 
                                            
Instructions to participants were worded as follows: “Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in the 
United States. At the top of the ladder the people who are the best off - those who have the most money, most 
education and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst off - who have the least 
money, least education, and the least respected jobs or no job. The higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you 
are to the people at the very top, and the lower you are, the closer you are to the people at the very bottom. Where 
would you place yourself on this ladder?” http://www.macses.ucsf.edu/ 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of 10-step social ladder scale used to assess subjective social status. 
2.2.2 Selective Attention to Threat 
2.2.2.1 Visual Probe Detection Task 
Participants’ attentional bias toward threat was assessed using a visual probe-detection 
task (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), commonly referred to as the “dot-probe task”. Twenty 
four actors, each expressing angry, fearful, happy, and neutral facial expressions, were selected 
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) 
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available at http://www.facialstimuli.com. The entire KDEF Stimuli Set consists of 4900 
different facial expression stimuli displayed by a variety of male and female models. An equal 
number of male and female models expressing the four affective conditions were used. This 
procedure is based on that of previous studies (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), and evidence suggests 
that the use of emotional faces, rather than words, might yield more consistent results in studies 
of attentional biases to threat (Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2006).  Happy expressions 
were included to determine whether predicted behavioral responses to fearful and angry faces 
can be attributed specifically to the threatening nature of the faces, rather than to emotional faces 
more generally (Cooper & Langton, 2006).  
Participants were seated behind the computer at a distance of approximately 60 cm from 
the screen to perform the probe detection task. Participants were instructed to observe the 
fixation point in the center of the monitor screen. They were then presented with a series of 
picture pairs (facial expressions). Participants first completed a practice trial, utilizing 18 picture 
pairs that differ from models used in the main dot-probe task. For the main task, six blocks of 24 
picture pairs ([24 angry, 24 fearful, and 24 happy expressions paired with the neutral expression 
of the same actor (12 female and 12 male)] were presented for a total of 144 trials (See Figure 3 
for example). Each trial began with the presentation of the central fixation point for 1000 ms, 
immediately followed by the picture pair for 200 ms. Immediately after the offset of the two 
pictures, a small dot probe was presented, appearing in the location previously occupied by one 
of the two pictures, and participants responded by pressing one of two keyboard buttons 
(indicating that the probe had appeared on either the right or the left side of the screen) as 
quickly and accurately as possible. The inter-stimulus interval was 1000 ms, and total task time 
was approximately ten minutes. The pictures and dot probe were presented equally often at the 
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right or left position and the order of trials was randomized for each participant.  E-Prime 
software (version 2.0) was used for the programming and presentation of the probe detection 
task, and was programmed to randomize the presentation order for each subject and collect the 
response accuracy and reaction time (RT) latencies. The dependent variable in this task is 
latencies in milliseconds to respond to the dot probe. 
            
Dot probe task
 
                      Figure 3. Example of probe/stimuli placement in dot probe task. 
2.2.3 Amygdala Reactivity 
2.2.3.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) was employed to investigate amygdala reactivity. BOLD fMRI is a noninvasive 
neuroimaging technique that utilizes an endogenous contrast signal associated with shifts in the 
relative magnetic susceptibility of oxy- and deoxy-hemoglobin resulting from activity in 
localized neuronal populations (Logothetis & Pfeuffer, 2004).  
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Participants were instructed to fast and to abstain from caffeine, tobacco products, and 
exercise for at least three hours and refrain from drinking alcohol and taking non-essential 
medication for 12 hours prior to scanning. Upon arrival to the Magnetic Resonance Research 
Center (MRRC - Presbyterian Hospital), eligible individuals provided written informed consent 
and underwent screening for contraindications for MRI scans (e.g. metallic foreign objects, 
pregnancy). Eligible subjects were then informed of the protocol, and the general instructions for 
each experimental task were reviewed. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to assess 
their comfort and ability to participate in the fMRI scan by entering an MRI simulator. 
Participants were instrumented for heart rate, and then entered the scanner. Those requiring 
corrective lenses were provided with MR-compatible glasses accommodating a full range of 
correction.  
 Each subject was scanned using a Siemens Allegra 3T scanner optimized for functional 
brain imaging. An automated shim procedure was applied to minimize possible magnetic field 
inhomogeneities. In-plane T2 structural images were acquired for visualization and 
normalization of functional imaging data. BOLD functional images were acquired using the 
following parameters: field of view: 200 x 200 mm; matrix size: 64 x 64 mm; repetition time: 2 
seconds; echo time: 29 ms; and flip angle: 90°. Thirty-four axial-oblique slices (3 mm thick, 0 
mm gap) were obtained using a gradient echo EPI sequence, oriented to the AC-PC line and 
encompassing the entire cerebrum and the majority of the cerebellum. All scanning parameters 
were selected to optimize the quality of the BOLD signal while maintaining a sufficient number 
of slices to acquire whole-brain data. 
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2.2.3.2 Amygdala Reactivity Paradigm 
The amygdala reactivity paradigm consisted of four blocks of a perceptual face 
processing task. Subjects viewed a trio of faces and selected one of two faces (bottom) that was 
identical to a target face (top) (Figure 4). Two blocks each of affectively-laden (angry, fearful, 
and happy) and neutral facial expressions were employed. The order of affective and neutral face 
matching blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. Each of these blocks consisted of six 
images, three of each sex (or target affect in the affective matching blocks) presented 
sequentially for four seconds. All face stimuli were derived from the MacArthur Network Face 
Stimuli Set (Tottenham et al., 2009) available at http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm. Within 
each face block, the interstimulus interval (ISI) varied between two, four, and six seconds (mean 
ISI = 4). This mixed trial design maximizes both the detection efficacy of sustained activity 
(BOLD Signal Amplitude) over entire blocks and the estimation efficacy of trial-related transient 
activity (modeling of hemodynamic characteristics) for individual trials (Birn, Cox, & 
Bandettini, 2002; Mechelli, Price, Henson, & Friston, 2003; Mechelli, Henson, Price, & Friston, 
2003). Total scan time was six minutes. During imaging, subjects responded by pressing one of 
two buttons with their right hand, allowing for the determination of accuracy and RT. 
Participants’ performance was monitored during all scanning trials. 
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           Figure 4. Example of experimental stimuli presented to participants during the functional scan. 
 
Corresponding to the use of facial expressions in the dot-probe task, reactivity to 
threatening (angry and fearful) faces was compared to responses to both happy and neutral faces. 
The inclusion of neutral face matching blocks allowed for examination of specific neural 
responses to affectively-laden facial expressions. The contrast of happy face matching blocks 
with angry and fearful faces permitted assessment of amygdala reactivity to non-threatening 
versus threat-related emotional faces. This paradigm also permits analyses of differential 
amygdala responses to angry and fearful faces, which may represent unambiguous and 
ambiguous threatening stimuli, respectively. 
2.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The present study sought to evaluate three primary hypotheses. Prior to analysis of these specific 
hypotheses, data on demographic characteristics and all indices of socioeconomic status were 
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first examined for normality. Extreme data outliers were identified and, if necessary, removed 
prior to applying appropriate data transformation to any non-normal variables in order to better 
approximate normal distribution.  
In hypothesis one, lower socioeconomic status was postulated have a significant 
association with an attentional bias to threat. After data was inspected for errors/outliers, mean 
RTs for each threat-related affective condition (anger and fear) were calculated, as were mean 
RTs for responses to happy faces (in order to determine whether responses were threat-specific, 
or merely general responses to emotional facial expressions. Attentional bias scores were then 
calculated using a standard formula (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998). Next, correlational analyses were 
used to detect significant associations between attentional bias scores and continuous SES 
variables. Any significant correlations were further inspected by linear regression analyses, first 
entering the dependent variable of interest (attentional bias score) alone in the regression 
equation, next entering the dependent variable after adjustment for age, sex and race. Linear 
regression analyses were similarly employed to examine relationships between bias scores and 
dichotomized SES variables. Finally, these associations were explored further by adding 
quadratic and cubic terms to the regression equation in order to test whether a nonlinear 
regression model best fit the data.  
Mean RTs for congruent (emotional face and probe in same location) and incongruent 
(emotional face and probe in different locations) trial types were calculated for each affective 
condition. Attentional bias scores were then calculated using a standard formula (e.g., Bradley et 
al., 1998): 
 
Attentional bias score = ½ [(RpLe – RpRe) + (LpRe – LpLe)] 
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In this equation, RpLe represents the participants’ mean RT for all right-sided 
incongruent trials (i.e. trials in which the probe was on the right side and the emotional face was 
on the left side), RpRe represents participants’ mean RT for all right-sided congruent trials, and 
LpRe and LpLe represent mean RTs for left-sided incongruent and congruent trials respectively. 
This formula calculates the “attention-capturing” quality of emotional faces by subtracting the 
mean probe detection times for congruent probes from the mean probe detection times for 
incongruent probes for both right sided and left sided presentations. Positive scores indicate 
faster responses to probes following emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli (attentional 
bias), negative scores indicate slower responding to probes following emotional stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli (avoidance), and scores around zero indicate neither bias toward nor 
avoidance of emotional stimuli. 
 For hypothesis two, lower socioeconomic status was predicted to be related to greater 
magnitude of amygdala response to visual threat-related stimuli on an fMRI task. Brain imaging 
data were preprocessed and analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8) software 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images for each subject were realigned to the first volume in 
the time series to correct for head motion, spatially normalized into a standard stereotactic space 
(Montreal Neurological Institute template) using a 12 parameter affine model. These normalized 
images were smoothed to minimize noise and residual differences in gyral anatomy with a 
Gaussian filter, set at 6 mm full-width at half-maximum.  
Following preprocessing, general linear models employing canonical hemodynamic 
response functions were used to estimate BOLD activation for each subject. In the first level of 
analysis, emotion-specific, within-subject contrasts were examined for each subject in order to 
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obtain each participant’s parameter estimate for condition-specific contrasts (e.g., matching of 
facial stimuli; angry face matching > shape matching). SPM computes univariate t-statistics 
(activation in response to a condition of a given task) at every voxel in the brain to generate the 
individual activation parameter estimates and within-subject variances that are necessary for 
‘second-level’ models in mixed-effects analyses (Mumford & Poldrack, 2007).  
 Predetermined condition effects at each voxel were calculated using a t statistic, 
producing a statistical contrast image for each directional comparison (angry > shapes, fear > 
shapes, happy > shapes, neutral > shapes, angry > neutral, fear > neutral, happy > neutral, angry 
> happy, fear > happy). To generate contrast images, BOLD signal changes for each condition 
(anger > shapes, etc.) were convolved with the default SPM hemodynamic response function. 
Next, task-related BOLD activation was estimated with a design matrix specifying a general 
linear model (GLM) that included regressors for the linear (x, y, z,) and rotational (pitch, roll, 
yaw) planes of movement, as well as any outliers identified via the the Artifact Detection Tool 
(ART; Mozes & Whitfield-Gabrieli, Neuroimaging Informatics Tools and Resources 
Clearinghouse, http://www.nitrc.org ). The ART program is used for manual detection of global 
mean and motion outliers in fMRI data. After determining the threshold values for global brain 
activation mean, linear motion parameters, and rotational motion parameters, outliers are defined 
as points that exceed the threshold in at least one of these variables. These outliers are then 
included as covariates in the general linear model created by SPM. Linear BOLD signal drifts 
were removed with a high-pass filter (128 s) (see Figure 5 for example of an individual 
participant SPM).  
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A. Glass Brain - maximum intensity projection of all activity in whole brain in response to task (i.e. 
presentation of fearful facial expressions), darkest areas are where t-statistics are highest  
 
B. Level one design matrix - each row is a time point, each column is a particular stimuli (here, first column is 
shapes, third column is fear stimuli, columns 6-7 represent covariation for outliers, columns 9-13 represent 
motion parameters). Constant term (white column at end) = intercept (represents average signal intensity 
across a run) 
 
C. Table of brain regions (specific locations in brain represented by MNI coordinates) significantly activated 
by the task. 
 
Figure 5. Example of individual participant statistical parametric map (SPM), examining whole brain reactivity to 
fearful facial expressions (contrasted with reactivity to shapes).  
 
The individual contrast images were then used in second-level mixed effects models, 
which accounts for both scan-to-scan and subject-to-subject variability, to determine task-
specific regional responses at the group-level for the entire sample (main effects of task). Second 
level analysis combines all individual means and within-subject variances in order to estimate 
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the between-subject variance and allow for group inferences. The BOLD signal change 
parameter estimates from the first level analysis comprise the dependent variable in the second 
level model. A statistical threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons across all 
suprathreshold voxels [(family wise error (FWE)], was used for these whole-brain comparisons.  
Statistical parametric maps were generated for each participant, for each contrast of interest, 
expressed as t statistics at each voxel (Figure 6).   
                    
A. Glass Brain - maximum intensity projection of all activity in whole brain in response to task (i.e. 
presentation of fearful facial expressions), darkest areas are where t-statistics are highest  
 
B. Level 2 design matrix – each row represents one participant, one column represents the one condition (have 
factored out any ‘nuisance’ variables) – in this case, the condition is the contrast between reactivity to fear 
faces subtracting out reactivity to shapes. 
 
C. Table of brain regions (specific locations in brain represented by MNI coordinates) significantly activated 
by the task. 
 
Figure 6. Example of second level (group map) of whole brain activity, examining whole brain reactivity to fearful 
facial expressions (contrasted with reactivity to shapes). 
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In order to target the amygdala as a region of interest (ROI), a BOLD signal time series 
was extracted from the left and the right amygdala for each individual. Given issues recently 
raised in the literature regarding the nonindependence of ROI selection from subsequent analyses 
(Vul et al., 2009), bilateral amygdala ROIs were pre-defined using the amygdala mask in the 
MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8, which derives ROIs from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
single-subject template (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). These consisted of 10 mm radius spheres 
centered on coordinates (left amygdala coordinates x, y, z = -26, 0, -20; right amygdala 
coordinates x, y, z= 24, 0, -20). Theories which posit hemispheric differences in emotion 
processing (Davidson, 1984; Sackeim & Gur, 1978; Sackeim et al., 1982; Schwartz, Davidson, 
& Maer, 1975) have raised the possibility that the left and right amygdala are differentially 
involved in the processing of emotional information. One such model, based on hemispheric 
differences associated with language, suggests involvement of the left amygdala in processing 
semantic material (e.g., scripts, sentences or words) and the right amygdala in processing non-
semantic stimuli (e.g., faces, pictures) (Markowitsch, 1998; Phelps et al., 2001). Other models 
concern the temporal dynamics of amygdala responses to emotional information, wherein the 
right amygdala may be more engaged in the rapid detection of emotional stimuli and the left 
amygdala plays a more substantial role in elaborate, detailed analysis of emotional information 
(Glascher & Adolphs, 2003; Wright et al., 2003). Consistent with these models, evidence 
supports a differential role for the left and right amygdala in the processing of affective 
information (Atchley, Ilardi, & Enloe, 2003; Canli et al., 1998). One recent meta-analysis of 54 
fMRI and PET studies reported significant differences in hemispheric lateralization, with the left 
amygdala being more often activated than the right amygdala, regardless of stimulus type, task 
instructions,  or habituation rates of the left and right amygdalae (Baas, Aleman, & Kahn, 2004). 
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Based on these findings, we analyzed right and left amygdala responses to facial expressions 
separately. 
Voxel-wise inferential testing was constrained to the amygdala ROIs using a statistical 
threshold of p < 0.05 with an extent threshold of 0 contiguous voxels and with individual 
MarsBaR ROIs used in small volume correction. A graphical representation of the resulting 
amygdala reactivity is provided in Figure 7. Beta values resulting from the Level 2 contrast 
images (left and right amygdala reactivity values) from each emotion-specific contrast for each 
participant were extracted from SPM.  Correlation analyses of the task-related activation in the 
left and right amygdala were performed to determine significant associations between separate 
emotion-specific contrasts and SES measures. Any significant correlations were further 
inspected by linear regression analyses, first entering the dependent variable of interest alone in 
the regression equation, next entering the dependent variable after adjustment for age, sex and 
race. Any of the emotion-specific amygdala reactivity measures that were significantly related to 
SES were submitted to linear regression analyses. Using emotion-specific contrasts as dependent 
variables, separate hierarchical regressions were employed for all social status measures to test 
whether SES was associated with extracted amygdala reactivity values independent of 
demographic covariates. Age, sex, and race were included as covariates in all analyses.  Finally, 
these associations were explored further by adding quadratic and cubic terms to the regression 
equation in order to test whether a nonlinear regression model best fit the data. 
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A.  Glass Brain - maximum intensity projection of all activity in whole brain in response to task (i.e. 
presentation of fearful facial expressions), darkest areas are where t-statistics are highest  
 
B. Level 2 design matrix - each row represents one participant, one column represents the one condition (have 
factored out any nuisance variables) – in this case, the condition is the contrast between reactivity to fear 
faces subtracting out reactivity to shapes. 
 
C. Representation of activation values in the specific region of interest (in this case, the left amygdala) - 
Eigenvariates - patterns of spatio-temporal correlation, first eigenvariate time series extracted from the peak 
t value for the left amygdala 
       
Figure 7. Example of 2nd level (group) statistical parametric map (SPM), examining left amygdala reactivity (as 
region of interest) to fearful facial expressions (contrasted with reactivity to shapes).  
 
Analysis of hypothesis three was dependent upon results of hypotheses one and two. 
Amygdala reactivity to facial expressions of negative emotion was hypothesized to mediate 
(account for) the effects of low socioeconomic status on selective attention to threat. In order to 
examine the amygdala reactivity as a potential mediator, regression analyses would first be 
performed to establish that the predictor variable (SES) and the hypothesized mediator 
(amygdala reactivity to threat) meet appropriate steps for establishing mediation (Baron & 
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Kenny, 1986). The Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) would then be utilized to determine the significance 
of the indirect pathway between the independent variable and the dependent variable (IV-> 
mediator -> DV), with z > ± 1.96 indicating a statistically significant pathway. 
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3.0  RESULTS 
3.1 DEMOGRAPHICS 
Descriptive statistics for all demographics variables are provided in Table 1. Female participants 
were significantly older than males (44.5 years vs. 40.6 years, F1,125 = 7.86, p = 0.006). Subjects 
included in the present analyses reported a mean subjective SES score of 6.2 ± 1.6 in the 
following proportions (from 2 = lowest to 10 = highest):  0.8%, 4.7%, 11.0%, 15.7%, 19.7%, 
27.6%, 16.5%, 3.1%, and 0.8%. Participants averaged 17.1 ± 2.7 years of schooling (range: 10–
24 years) (GED [0.8%]; completed high school [3.9%]; technical training [2.4%]; postsecondary 
education without degree [7.9%]; Associate’s degree [4.7%]; Bachelor’s degree [41.7%]; 
Master’s or equivalent professional degree [26%]; Doctoral or doctoral-level professional degree 
[12.6%]). When analyzing education as a dichotomous variable, participants who did not achieve 
at least an associate’s degree (15% of sample) were included the low education group. Mean 
family income was within the $50-64,999 range (6.8 ± 3.1), with the proportion of subjects 
falling within the 15 ranges of reported income (lowest to highest) as follows: 1.6%, 3.1%, 6.3%, 
3.9%, 16.5%, 18.9%,14.2%, 9.4%, 8.7%, 4.7%, 2.4%, 2.4%, 1.6%, 0.8%, and 5.5%. The 15% of 
participants reporting income at or below $35,000 per year were included in the low income 
group for analyses of income as a dichotomous variable. All continuous SES variables were 
scrutinized for normality; serious departures from normality are variables for which skewness 
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exceeds three (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996) and kurtosis exceeds 10 (DeCarlo, 1997). Skewness 
and kurtosis values for all SES measures fell well within acceptable ranges. 
Correlational analyses were conducted to test for significant relations among 
demographic variables and indices of social status (Table 2). Sex was not associated with any of 
the individual participant SES measures, although males did report significantly lower parental 
education levels as compared with females (p’s < .01). Consistent with prior literature (Chen, 
Martin, & Matthews, 2006; Goodman, Huang, Schafer-Kalkhoff, & Adler, 2007), African 
American race was associated with lower S-SES ladder rankings (r = -.26, p < .01), fewer years 
of education (r = -.18, p < .05), lower family income (r = -.20, p < .05), and lower composite 
SES scores (r = -.24, p < .01). Whites reported significantly lower paternal education levels than 
did African Americans (p < .05). Age was positively related to higher family income and 
composite SES (p’s < .05), but was not associated with years of education or subjective SES. 
Older age was significantly related to lower rankings of paternal S-SES, as well as lower parental 
education levels (p’s < .05).   
Across subjects, subjective SES (ladder rankings) correlated significantly with years of 
education (r = .43, p = .001) and income range (r = .49, p = .001), indicating that individuals 
earning a lower income and completing fewer years of schooling tended also to perceive 
themselves as holding a lower social standing than more “objectively” advantaged study 
participants (Table 3). Correlations between the parental education measures varied (mothers’ vs. 
fathers’ education level, r = 0.65; mothers’ vs. fathers’ S-SES, r = 0.87; p’s < 0.01) indicating 
that each indicator may provide unique information regarding the contribution of parental SES to 
selective attention to threat and amygdala reactivity (Table 3).  Several participants’ individual 
SES indices were significantly and positively related to parental S-SES and parental education, 
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with correlations ranging from .36 (father’s education level with composite SES, p < .01) to .23 
(father’s S-SES with family income, p < .01). 
3.2 HYPOTHESIS ONE  
Lower socioeconomic status will be associated with an attentional bias to threat as reflected on a 
visual probe-detection task. 
3.2.1 Reaction Time Data 
Participants (n = 127) each completed 144 trials of the dot probe task (total responses = 
18,288). Data from trials with errors and/or response time outliers (< 200ms and > 2000 ms) 
were removed (0.01% of trials). RTs for each emotion type were then scrutinized for normality; 
serious departures from normality are variables for which absolute values of skewness exceed 
three (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996) and kurtosis exceed 10 (DeCarlo, 1997). Skewness and 
kurtosis for each affective condition exceeded these values; therefore, values that deviated more 
than three standard deviations (SDs) from the mean RT for each affective condition were 
identified as extreme outliers and were removed (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). Following 
removal of these outliers, skewness and kurtosis values for all measures fell within acceptable 
ranges. This final sample of dot probe responses (n = 18,042) was used for all further analyses.         
In order to determine whether participants demonstrated habituation to emotional stimuli 
across time in the dot probe task, we subjected RTs to a repeated measures ANOVA with affect 
(anger, fear, happy) and block (1st through 6th) as within subjects factors. Analyses failed to 
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reveal any habituation effects, demonstrating no significant main effect for block (F5,630 = 0.38, p 
= .862) (Figure 8), while there were significant differences in RTs between the three affective 
conditions(F2, 252 = 28.63, p = 0.000)] (Figure 8). No significant affect by block interaction was 
detected (F10,1260 = 1.66, p =.085). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey’s HSD test revealed 
that RTs to angry stimuli (M = 392.3ms, SD = 85.4) were significantly faster (p < .02) than RTs 
to fearful faces (M = 396.7ms, SD = 86.0), while responses to happy faces (M = 405.8ms, SD = 
96.9) were significantly slower than to either of the threat-related facial stimuli (p’s < .001).   
(Figure 9).  
 
                   
No significant 
main effect for 
block (F5,630 = 
0.38, p = .862) 
Significant 
differences in RTs 
between affective 
conditions (F2, 252 = 
28.63, p = 0.000)
 
    
                            Figure 8. Dot probe reaction times (RTs) across blocks for each emotion type. 
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p < 0.02 p’s < 0.001
 
                                      Figure 9. Dot probe mean RTs, post-hoc comparisons across emotion type. 
 
 
Next, RTs were analyzed for effects of congruence using repeated measures ANOVA. 
There was no significant main effect of congruence (F 1,126 = 1.42, p > .05] on participants’ 
response latencies, nor was a significant affect by congruence interaction detected (F2,252 = 0.51, 
p > .05). Thus, participants did not appear to display an attentional bias toward any of the three 
types of emotional stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli, which is inconsistent with the prediction 
that participants would preferentially attend to threatening pictures (Figure 10). 
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                              Congruent = probe on same side of emotional facial expression 
                              Incongruent = probe on opposite side of emotional facial expression 
 
                Figure 10. Differences between RTs for congruent versus incongruent presentation of emotional faces. 
3.2.2 Attentional Bias Scores 
Finally, bias scores for each subject were computed for each emotion type using the equation 
noted previously (Bradley et al., 1998). Bias scores for all affect types were determined to be 
normally distributed.  Mean (SD) bias scores across participants for each emotion type were: 
anger: -4.9 ms (31.9), fear: 14.7 ms (54.9), happy: 2.2 ms (48.9) Repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no significant difference in bias scores across blocks 1 - 6 of the dot probe task (F5,630 = 
0.64, p = .426), although there was a significant main effect of emotion type (F2,252 = 31.62, p = 
0.000). Post hoc tests (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that while anger and happy bias scores did not 
differ significantly from one another (p = .15), both anger and happy bias scores were 
significantly different from fear bias scores (p’s < .04) (Figure 11).  
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 Figure 11. Comparison between mean bias scores across participants for each affective condition. 
 
Table 4 displays the correlations between bias scores, demonstrating a significant 
association between fear and anger biases (r = 0.23, p < 0.01). A weaker, albeit significant, 
correlation was shown for fear and happy bias scores (r = 0.18, p < 0.05). No significant 
association was noted between anger and happy bias scores. The presence of a significant 
positive (orienting) or negative (avoidance) attentional bias was evaluated by performing 1-
sample t-tests, comparing the difference from zero (zero indications absence of an attentional 
bias). Neither angry nor happy bias scores were significantly different from zero (anger: t = -
1.73, p = 0.087; happy: t = 0.50, p = 0.615). Conversely, fear bias scores did differ significantly 
from zero (t = 3.02, p = 0.003) in a positive direction, signifying that participants had a 
significant orienting response toward fear faces.   
Following the strategy employed by Schmukle (2005), Cronbach’s α was used as the 
method for estimating the internal consistency of the bias indices. During the task, the 144 
critical trials for each participant had been administered as six blocks, each containing 24 critical 
trials (eight anger faces, eight fearful faces, and eight happy faces each paired with a neutral 
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face).  A bias index was then calculated for each separate block for each affective condition, and 
internal consistency was subsequently computed based on these values. Cronbach’s α was 
insufficient for the anger bias index (Cronbach’s α = 0.42) but reached values considered 
sufficient (Spooren et al., 2007) for fear (Cronbach’s α = 0.77) and happy (Cronbach’s α = 0.72) 
bias scores. 
3.2.3 Threat Bias and SES 
Bias scores for each affective condition were examined for relationships to demographic 
variables (Table 5). No significant relationships were found between bias scores and sex or age. 
Point biserial correlations revealed a significant association between anger bias and race, 
suggesting greater bias toward threat among African American participants.  
Correlation analyses were conducted comparing participants’ bias scores for threatening 
emotional stimuli (angry and fearful facial expressions) with measures of individuals’ objective, 
subjective, and parental SES. These associations are displayed in Table 5. None of these 
correlation coefficients reached statistical significance, indicating that no significant relationship 
existed between SES and threat-related bias scores. Similarly, participants’ bias scores for happy 
facial expressions were also not related to any of the SES indices. Linear regression analyses, 
performed in order to examine the relationship between dichotomized SES variables and anger, 
fear, and happy attentional bias scores, also failed to demonstrate an association between 
participants’ bias scores and membership in the lower versus higher income group (Table 6) or 
education group (Table 7).   
Due to the significant relationships between race and several SES measures, race-specific 
analyses of the relation between attentional bias scores and SES were initially considered. 
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However, because the remaining number of African American participants (n = 14) was not of 
sufficient sample size to maintain model stability (Peduzzi et al., 1996), no race-specific analyses 
were conducted. 
3.2.4 Results Summary for Hypothesis One 
In sum, participants did not exhibit significant RT variations (i.e. no habituation) across task 
blocks when responding to either threat-related (angry and fearful) or happy facial expressions 
on a visual probe detection task. As expected, the present findings indicate that threat-related 
faces elicited more rapid response times than did happy facial expressions. Contrary to the study 
hypothesis, participants’ responses to congruent probes (probe presented on same side as 
emotional face) elicited significantly slower RTs than did incongruent probes for angry facial 
expressions, while no congruency differences were noted for either fearful or happy emotional 
faces. Moreover, the calculated bias scores indicated an attentional bias for fearful faces only, 
whereas no significant bias toward or avoidance of angry faces was noted. Finally, in no case 
were indices of social status found to be related to attentional bias scores for any of the affective 
stimuli. 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS TWO 
Lower socioeconomic status will predict greater magnitude of amygdala response to visual 
threat-related stimuli on a functional neuroimaging task. 
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3.3.1 Analysis of fMRI Data in SPM 
After ascertaining participants’ activation values within the left and right amygdala for each 
affective condition, these values were extracted from SPM and entered into SPSS. Extracted beta 
values were then scrutinized for normality based on previously identified ranges (Curran, West, 
& Finch, 1996; DeCarlo, 1997).  Skewness and kurtosis values for all amygdala reactivity 
measures fell within acceptable ranges.  
Table 8 displays the significant BOLD fMRI responses in the amygdala for all contrasts 
at the whole brain peak level. Significant amygdala reactivity was found for most contrasts, 
although no cluster of voxels were significantly activated for the following contrasts: right 
amygdala activation to happy faces with shapes, left amygdala activation to angry faces with 
happy faces, or bilateral amygdala activation for neutral faces versus happy faces. Tables 9 – 11 
display intercorrelations between right and left amygdala activation values for all contrasts in 
which significant activation remained upon removal of any residual activation due to amygdala 
responses to viewing other visual stimuli. Correlations between all facial stimuli (angry, fearful, 
happy, and neutral) in contrast to viewing shapes are shown in Table 9, as are correlations 
between all affective conditions contrasted with neutral faces (Table 10) and threat-related facial 
expressions with happy stimuli (Table 11). Correlations between the left and right amygdala for 
each condition were significant at the p < .01 level (anger: r = .55, fear: r = .52, happy: r = .63, 
neutral: r = .55). For every affective condition, beta values were significantly higher for the right 
amygdala than the left (p’s < .01) (Table 12, Figure 12). Despite the significant associations 
between left and right hemispheres, evidence supports a differential role for the left and right 
amygdala in the processing of affective information (Alfano & Cimino, 2008; Atchley, Ilardi, & 
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Enloe, 2003; Baas, Aleman, & Kahn, 2004; Canli et al., 1998), precluding data reduction across 
the left and right amygdala.   
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         Figure 12. Comparison of right and left amygdala activation values for each affective condition > shapes.  
 
 
We hypothesized that participants would exhibit significantly stronger amygdala 
responses to threatening faces versus non-facial visual stimuli (i.e. shapes) or to other emotional 
facial expressions. Beta values between amygdala reactivity to angry and fearful faces (in 
contrast with shapes) were compared to the beta values in contrast with neutral faces (Table 13, 
Figure 13), and amygdala reactivity values were consistently and significantly higher for shape 
contrasts, compared to neutral contrasts.  
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                Figure 13. Comparison of amygdala activation values between contrast conditions.  
 
 Relationships between amygdala reactivity values and demographic characteristics are 
shown in Tables 14 and 15. Amygdala activation to anger faces, in contrast with shapes, was 
significantly higher in white versus African American participants (r = -.17, p < .05). Left 
amygdala activity to happy faces was significantly greater in females vs. males (r =.20, p < .05). 
3.3.2 Amygdala Reactivity and SES 
Correlation analyses were conducted in order to determine associations between participants’ 
amygdala reactivity scores for angry and fearful stimuli and continuous measures of individuals’ 
objective, subjective, and parental SES. Linear regression analyses were used to analyze whether 
amygdala reactivity scores were associated with dichotomized measures of income and 
education. These results are summarized in Tables 16 - 27. No significant associations were 
noted between continuous or dichotomous measures of individuals’ social standing and 
amygdala reactivity to angry facial expressions (Tables 16 - 18). However, in regards to 
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participants’ parental SES measures, mother’s education level was significantly associated with 
right amygdala activation to fearful facial stimuli in a positive direction (Table 19). When 
examining the left amygdala, participants with fewer years of education (Figure 14), lower 
family income, and lower composite SES scores showed greater left amygdala reactivity to fear 
faces (p’s < 0.05) (Table 25). Membership in the low (versus high) income group was also 
associated with greater left amygdala activation to fear stimuli (Table 26).  
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       Figure 14. Inverse correlation between years of education and left amygdala activation to fearful facial stimuli  
      (contrasted with shapes). 
 
Next, continuous SES variables that demonstrated significant correlational associations 
with amygdala reactivity to fear stimuli were subjected to linear hierarchical regression analyses 
in order to further investigate whether SES indicators were related to greater amygdala reactivity 
independent of demographic covariates (age, sex, and race). As displayed in Tables 28 and 29, 
these associations were first examined alone and then with covariate-adjustment by entering 
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covariates simultaneously on the first step of each regression equation. Covariates included 
gender (1 = male, 2 = female), age (in years), and race (1= white, 2 = African American).  
Examination of participants’ maternal education, using linear regression, showed higher 
mother’s education level to predict greater right amygdala reactivity to fearful facial expressions 
(fear > shapes:  β = .079, SE = .030, p = .010; fear > happy: β = .042, SE = .020, p = .041), a 
relationship which was in the opposite direction of what was expected. These relationships 
persisted upon adjustment for covariates (fear > shapes:  β = .105, SE = .031, p = .001; fear > 
happy: β = .060, SE = .021, p = .005) (Table 28). 
Upon further examining relationships between amygdala activity and continuous 
measures of individuals’ objective SES (Table 29), linear multiple regression analyses showed 
fewer years of education to predict higher left amygdala reactivity to fearful facial stimuli, 
whether in contrast with shapes (Figure 15) or with neutral faces (fear > shapes: β = -.112, SE = 
.056, p = .046; fear > neutral: β = -.120, SE = .054, p = .028). Similarly, lower family income 
was associated with higher left amygdala reactivity to fearful facial stimuli (fear > shapes: β = -
.118, SE = .053, p = .028), and lower composite SES was predictive of higher left amygdala 
reactivity to fearful facial stimuli, whether in contrast with shapes or with neutral faces (fear > 
shapes: β = -.147, SE = .055, p = .008; fear > neutral: β = -.122, SE = .054, p = .025). The 
relationship between years of education and left amygdala reactivity (fear > neutral) persisted 
after covariates were entered into the model (β = -.116, SE = .056, p = .041), while the 
association between family income and left amygdala reactivity was no longer significant. Lower 
composite SES continued to predict greater left amygdala reactivity to fearful facial stimuli, 
whether in contrast with shapes or with neutral faces, upon adjustment for covariates (fear > 
shapes: β = -.142, SE = .059, p = .018; fear > neutral: β = -.122, SE = .058, p = .037).  
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  Figure 15. Linear regression model of years of education predicting left amygdala reactivity to fear faces (in  
  contrast with shapes). 
 
 
The results of an additional set of regression analyses, whereby an interaction term of 
SES by age was entered on Step 3, failed to demonstrate a significant interaction of SES with age 
(p’s < .05). These results are not reported here. Because of the significant relationships between 
race and several SES measures, race-specific analyses of the relation between attentional bias 
scores and SES were initially considered. However, because the remaining number of African 
American participants (n = 14) was not of sufficient sample size to maintain model stability 
(Peduzzi et al., 1996), no race-specific analyses were conducted.  
 Finally, the same amygdala reactivity values that were significantly correlated with SES 
indices were again examined, this time by adding nonlinear terms to the regression models in 
order to test for linearity of the associations. These results are displayed in Tables 30 and 31. 
Figure 16 provides an example of a nonlinear regression model for the association of years of 
school and left amygdala reactivity to fear > shapes) (nonlinear: B = -.004, SE = .005, p = .454). 
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In no cases did nonlinear regression appear to provide the best explanation for the patterns 
observed in the data. Thus, it appears that the best fit for these was a linear model. 
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Figure 16. Nonlinear regression model of years of education predicting left amygdala reactivity to fear faces (in 
contrast with shapes). 
 
3.3.3 Results Summary for Hypothesis Two 
In general, participants in the current investigation exhibited stronger bilateral amygdala 
activation to threat-related facial expressions than to neutral facial expressions, happy facial 
expressions, and non-facial visual stimuli. Right-sided activation values tended to be larger than 
for the left amygdala for every affective condition. Left amygdala reactivity to fearful faces was 
negatively related to SES, whether reported as years of education, family income, or a composite 
of these measures. Linear regression accounted better for the relationship between amygdala 
reactivity and SES, as compared to a curvelinear model. 
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3.4 HYPOTHESIS THREE 
Insofar as hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported, amygdala reactivity to facial expressions of 
negative emotion will mediate (account for) the effects of low socioeconomic status on selective 
attention to threat. 
 
Correlational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between attentional 
bias for threat and amygdala reactivity. As displayed in Tables 32 and 33, the majority of 
significant associations between attentional bias scores and amygdala reactivity were between ± 
.20 and .30. In general, attentional bias toward happy expressions was negatively related to 
amygdala reactivity to both fearful and happy faces, while anger bias scores tended to be 
positively related to amygdala reactivity to emotional faces of all types.    
Sobel’s test of mediation was to be used in evaluating whether amygdala reactivity scores 
might account for a substantial portion of the variance in the relationship between indices of 
social status and attentional bias scores. As seen in Table 5, however, no significant association 
was demonstrated between socioeconomic status and attentional bias for threat. Thus, the 
variables of interest did not meet criteria for testing mediation, preventing further analyses 
regarding this model. 
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
Despite a well-documented inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and disorders of 
negative affect, the underlying mechanisms by which social inequalities impair mental health are 
not fully understood. In the current study, we proposed that heightened exposure to stressful life 
events would sensitize lower SES individuals to potential threats in the environment. To this end, 
three primary hypotheses were put forth. Hypothesis one of this investigation examined whether 
socioeconomic status is associated with attentional bias for threat as measured by a visual probe 
detection task. Considering the role of the amygdala in affective regulation, particularly the 
processing of threatening stimuli, the purpose of hypothesis two was to examine whether social 
status was related to amygdala reactivity to visual threat-related stimuli on a functional 
neuroimaging task. Assuming that hypotheses one and two were supported, hypothesis three 
aimed to assess whether the bias toward threatening visual stimuli might be mediated at the 
neurobiological level via increased amygdala responsiveness to social threat. However, results of 
the current study demonstrate no support for hypothesis one and extremely limited support for 
hypothesis two; by virtue of the limited findings for the first and second hypotheses, we were 
unable to test hypothesis three. In the following sections, we examine the results of each aspect 
of the study, detailing what might account for the lack of significant findings. Finally, more 
general limitations and directions for future research are discussed. 
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4.1 SELECTIVE ATTENTION FOR THREAT 
Attention toward potential threats in the environment serves an adaptive function; i.e. to allow 
individuals to rapidly detect and appropriately respond to dangers (LeDoux, 1996; Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007). However, attentional bias toward possible threatening stimuli may also contribute to 
the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Substantial 
evidence supports an association between selective attention for threat and disorders of negative 
affect (Kroeze & van den Hout, 2000; Bradley et al., 1999; Horenstein & Segui, 1997; MacLeod 
et al., 1986; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992). The chronic distress engendered by 
membership in lower SES groups has been posited to lead to a state of heightened vigilance for 
threat (Taylor & Seeman, 1999; Feldman & Steptoe, 2004), and, consistent with this rationale, 
we predicted that lower SES would be associated with greater attentional bias to threat faces on 
the dot probe task. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether a relationship 
exists between SES and selective attention for threat using the dot probe paradigm. 
4.1.1 Reaction Times to Threatening Stimuli 
Overall, participants demonstrated significantly faster response times to angry and fearful 
facial stimuli, compared with happy facial expressions, which is consistent with past findings 
suggesting that humans orient fastest to threatening faces as a part of an evolved, specialized 
response necessary for human survival (Fox, Lester, Russo, Pichler, & Dutton, 2000; Öhman, 
Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Mean RTs in our study were consistent with participant RTs 
reported in other investigations utilizing fearful/neutral and angry/neutral facial stimuli (Cooper 
& Langton, 2006; Lipp & Derakshan, 2005).  
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Participants’ mean response times were used to calculate attentional bias scores (e.g., 
Bradley et al., 1998) toward threatening (angry and fearful) facial expressions, and attentional 
bias score values were in line with prior studies (Cooper & Langton, 2006; Lipp & Derakshan, 
2005). Although we had expected significant attentional bias toward both types of threatening 
faces, participants in our sample exhibited significant bias for fear faces, but not toward angry 
facial expressions. These findings are consistent with Davis and Whalen’s (2001) hypothesis that 
the threat-processing system is most reactive to ambiguous (or indirect) threat cues, and that 
fearful faces are more ambiguous (i.e. signify presence of danger without identifying the source) 
than are expressions of anger. When comparing threat bias using “high” threat pictures versus 
“milder” forms of threat, it has been demonstrated that high threat pictures capture attention in 
all individuals (Mogg et al., 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) while findings are inconsistent for 
mild threat presentations. These findings suggest if threat stimuli exceed a certain threshold, 
attentional biases will be demonstrated for all individuals (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998). It is possible that the threat-salience of the pictorial stimuli used in the current 
study might vary by emotional condition, with fearful facial expressions representing higher 
threat value than the angry faces. 
4.1.2 Threat Bias and SES 
Socioeconomic status shapes both the types of events that individuals experience throughout 
their lives, as well as the individual resources utilized to respond to these events. These resources 
include biological characteristics, such as physical health, health behaviors, and genetic factors, 
psychological factors (cognitions, emotions, personality characteristics), social relationships, and 
financial resources (access to either preventative care or medical treatments). In this study, we 
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hypothesized that the frequency and intensity of exposure to harmful or potentially threatening 
situations engendered by membership in lower social strata might render lower SES individuals 
more “sensitized” to cues of possible danger. Contrary to our expectations, however, we found 
no evidence of a significant relationship between socioeconomic status and attentional bias 
toward threatening stimuli on the dot probe task. 
There are several potential explanations for our lack of findings regarding SES and 
attentional bias toward threat. Perhaps individuals’ selective attention toward fearful facial 
expressions did not vary by SES simply because social standing does not differentially sensitize 
people to these specific stimuli. Although the chronic exposure to the unpredictable and stressful 
conditions inherent in lower SES environments could be reflected in individuals’ increased 
vigilance and heightened sensitivity to social threats (Chen & Matthews, 2001; Repetti et al., 
2002; Taylor et al., 2004; Evans & Kim, 2007), it may be that our task failed to tap into the 
specific type of social threat that is relevant to elucidate SES-related differences. Dickerson and 
colleagues (2004) suggest that lower SES individuals may experience frequent threats in the 
context of social “preservation”, wherein stressors arise from uncertainty regarding one’s social 
esteem or status. Lower SES individuals may experience social status threats involving social 
devaluation, discrimination, and rejection, essentially developing the perception of being 
evaluated negatively by others. Living and working in lower SES environments may contribute 
to diminished self-esteem, lower sense of control, and a reduced orientation toward mastery and 
efficacy (Amato & Zuo, 1992; McLoyd, 1998; Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 1981), 
and individuals in low socioeconomic groups report lower perceived control than those 
occupying higher social status (Bailis et al., 2001; Lachman & Weaver, 1998). Also, in line with 
the concept of stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), 
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perceived class-based stereotypes such as laziness (Leahy, 1981), dishonesty (Desmond, Price, & 
Eoff, 1989) and educational disinterest (Bullock, 1999) in low SES individuals may activate the 
fear of being labeled as such by virtue of membership in a lower-SES group. Perhaps the 
experience of negative social evaluation is a more critical “threat” stimulus than what was 
hypothesized here - i.e., anger and/or fear as a result of living and working in potentially 
dangerous environments. This tendency toward fear of class-based rejection may represent a 
subtle (yet critical) difference from our manner of evaluating threat via angry and fearful facial 
stimuli on the dot probe. In this case, perhaps facial expressions representing disapproval or 
disgust would have represented a more salient “threat” for detecting variation in attention based 
on social status.  
Additional exploration of the methodology used in our study may shed further light on 
the lack of significant findings relating SES to selective attention for threat. The dot probe 
paradigm has proven fairly robust in detecting selective attention for threat in clinically anxious 
participants (Bradley et al., 1999; MacLeod et al., 1986; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, 
Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-Morris, 1990; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Horenstein & 
Segui, 1997; Kroeze & van den Hout, 2000), although not all studies of clinical groups have 
successfully demonstrated this bias (Gotlib et al., 2004; Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg, Bradley, de 
Bono, & Painter, 1997; Pineles & Mineka, 2005). However, the findings for non-clinical 
individuals using the dot probe are relatively inconsistent. Broadbent and Broadbent (1988) 
found that low anxiety and moderate anxiety subjects did not show an attentional bias, whereas 
highly anxious individuals directed their attention toward threatening words. A meta-analysis by 
Bar-Haim and colleagues (2007) found no significant attentional bias in nonanxious participants, 
whereas other studies report significant vigilance for threatening faces in nonanxious groups 
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(Cooper & Langton, 2006; Bradley et al., 1997). In regards to these inconsistent findings, Mogg 
et al. (2000) suggest that the dot probe task appears to provide a “relatively fragile index of 
anxiety-related attentional biases in non-clinical studies” (p. 1074). 
Further examination of the overall validity of the dot probe task may also help to clarify 
our findings. Cronbach’s α was used as the method for estimating the internal consistency of the 
dot probe task in the current investigation. Reliability was noted to be insufficient for the anger 
bias index (Cronbach’s α = 0.42) but reached values considered sufficient (Spooren et al., 2007) 
for fear faces (Cronbach’s α = 0.77). In contrast to our findings regarding consistency, Schmukle 
(2005) concluded that the dot probe task is an unreliable measure of attentional allocation in non-
clinical samples by examining the internal consistency of two versions of the dot probe (using 
both verbal and pictorial stimuli). Unlike our investigation, Schmukle (2005) did not include 
facial photographs of human faces as stimuli. However, the author’s findings raise doubts 
regarding the overall validity of the task as an indicator of attentional bias.   
Our task did not include a baseline condition in which participants were asked to react to 
the dot probe when viewing neutral-neutral picture pairs. The inclusion of this condition would 
have provided evidence of whether differences in attentional bias resulted from vigilance toward 
a particular stimulus (RTs to threatening targets were faster than the neutral/neutral baseline) or 
avoidance of stimuli (RTs to threat stimuli slower than the baseline) (Cooper & Langton, 2006). 
Despite the lack of inclusion of this baseline in our investigation, prior research indicates that the 
stimulus presentation time for our task (i.e. 200 ms) most likely elicited attentional bias toward 
threat, as opposed to avoidance of threat-related stimuli. For instance, in comparing social 
phobics with control participants, Stevens, Rist and Gerlach (2009) demonstrated attentional bias 
toward angry faces at 175 ms, but not at 500 ms, on the dot probe task. Mogg, Philippot, and 
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Bradley (2004) found bias toward angry faces at 500 ms, but not at 1250 ms, in a similar 
comparison of social phobics and controls. These data suggest that relatively shorter exposure 
durations produce threat bias, but that attentional bias shifts toward avoidance of threat stimuli 
when shown for durations of 500 ms and longer. Other research has found that exposure 
durations of 100 ms produce attentional bias, while durations of 500 ms do not (Cooper & 
Langton, 2006; Holmes, Green & Vuilleumier, 2005).  
In sum, our hypothesis that selective attention to threat would be related to SES was not 
supported. On the whole, interpretation of our visual probe detection task findings is limited. 
Considering the questions of task validity, uncertainty regarding whether response times 
represent attentional bias toward threatening faces or avoidance of threats, and the prior 
inconsistent findings when using the dot probe task with non-anxious populations, it is 
reasonable to question whether utilization of the dot probe task provided an insufficient test of 
our first study hypothesis. However, it is also possible that the problems do not lie in use of the 
dot-probe methodology specifically, but in the type of stimuli presented when attempting to 
elucidate SES-based differences in the allocation of attention. 
4.2 AMYGDALA REACTIVITY TO THREAT 
Substantial evidence shows lower SES individuals more likely to experience stressful life 
events than those of higher social status. Low SES individuals are disproportionately exposed to 
community-level violence, crime, and crowding (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996; Evans, 2001; 
Fitzpatrick & Boldizar, 1993; Homel & Burns, 1987). Relative to higher SES youth, adolescents 
from lower SES families are more likely to perceive their school (Gallup, 1993; Sinclair et al., 
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1994) and their neighborhood as dangerous and violent (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996).  Being 
witness to or victimized by high levels of neighborhood, school, or home violence is associated 
with poor emotion regulation and maladaptive processing of social information (McDonald et 
al., 2007; Schwartz, & Proctor, 2000). Chen, Cohen and Miller (2010) found that children from 
lower-SES backgrounds reported higher levels of family stress and greater perceptions of threat 
compared with children of higher social status, and others have suggested that socioeconomic 
status is related to a state of heightened vigilance for threat (Taylor & Seeman, 1999; Feldman & 
Steptoe, 2004). 
The human amygdala is thought to be a key component of the neural circuitry that 
evaluates the meaning and importance of social information (LeDoux, 2000), and consistent 
evidence demonstrates a particular sensitivity to threat-related facial expressions (Adolphs, 2002; 
Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Phillips et al., 2003). Considering the role of the 
amygdala in threat-related processes, in combination with the heightened exposure to threat 
experienced by lower SES individuals, we predicted that lower SES would be associated with 
greater amygdala response to threat-related facial expressions on an fMRI task. To our 
knowledge, this is only the second investigation to examine whether a relationship exists 
between SES and amygdala reactivity. 
4.2.1 Amygdala Reactivity to Facial Stimuli 
Comparable to the extant literature (Hariri et al., 2002; LeDoux, 2000; Whalen, 1998), we found 
that presentation of threatening emotional stimuli elicited significant amygdala activation. It was 
hypothesized that amgydala responses to threatening stimuli would be greater than to either non-
facial visual stimuli (shapes) or to nonthreatening facial expressions (neutral and happy faces). 
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Consistent with these expectations, results of the current study did show greater amygdala 
responses to fearful and angry faces than to other visual stimuli. Overall, amydgala activation 
values for face-matching (independent of affective valence of the facial expression) were 
significantly higher than values elicited during shape-matching tasks. Moreover, presentation of 
threatening faces generally resulted in significantly higher amygdale reactivity than did non-
threat (happy or neutral) faces. 
4.2.2 Amygdala Reactivity and SES  
We found very limited support for a relationship between SES measures and amygdala reactivity 
to threatening faces. No significant associations were noted between any measures of social 
standing and amygdala reactivity to angry facial expressions. With respect to fearful faces, after 
controlling for demographic covariates, regression analyses showed significant associations 
between fewer years of education and higher left amygdala reactivity, in contrast with neutral 
faces. Similarly, lower composite SES was significantly associated with left amygdala reactivity 
to fearful facial stimuli, whether in contrast with shapes or with neutral faces, upon adjustment 
for covariates. Maternal education was also associated with amygdala reactivity to fear faces, 
albeit in the opposite direction of what was expected.  The few findings showing lower SES 
related significantly to heightened amygdala reactivity were limited to fearful faces and would 
not have survived correction for multiple comparisons. In sum, our prediction of an inverse 
association between indices of social standing and amygdala reactivity to threatening stimuli was 
largely unsupported by the results. 
There are several potential explanations for our lack of findings regarding SES and 
amygdala reactivity toward threatening facial stimuli. Perhaps individuals’ neural responses 
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toward fearful facial expressions did not vary by SES because amygdala sensitization to these 
specific stimuli is not conditioned by SES. As noted previously, lower SES has been associated 
with reduced self-esteem and lower perceived control (Amato & Zuo, 1992; Bailis et al., 2001; 
Baum et al., 1999; Lachman & Weaver, 1998; McLoyd, 1998; Pearlin et al., 1981), and 
awareness of negative status-based stereotypes may heighten perceptions of discrimination in 
those with relatively lower educational, financial, or occupational status (Brown et al., 2006; 
Feldman & Hilterman, 1974; Guyll et al., 2001; Matthews et al., 2005; Weeks & Lupfer, 2004). 
In line with these findings, lower SES individuals may demonstrate greater bias toward 
indicators of social rejection, rather than examples of more overt threats represented by facial 
expressions depicting a more global, nonspecific threat. In this case, an examination of brain 
structures other than the amygdala might be more conducive to detecting SES-related threats to 
social connection. For instance, the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and the right ventral 
prefrontal cortex (RVPFC) show heightened activation in response to perceptions of being 
socially excluded (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003).  
However, although it is possible that the amygdala is not involved in SES-related 
detection of social threats, prior evidence regarding amygdala reactivity and SES suggests 
otherwise.  Zink and colleagues (2008) found that viewing a superior ranking individual resulted 
in heightened amygdala activity, and Gianaros et al. (2008) found that college students with 
lower perceived parental social status demonstrated heightened amygdala reactivity in fMRI to 
threatening facial expressions, as compared to those rating their parents as having higher SES. 
Thus, our findings are not consistent with the prior, albeit limited, findings regarding SES and 
amygdala activity. Perhaps, then, the lack of a significant association between social standing 
and amygdala reactivity in our investigation could be a result of methodological constraints.  
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For instance, although we achieved at least 90% amygdala coverage during the fMRI task for 
participants in the current sample, it is possible that some signal loss (due to a placement error 
while in the scanner) may have resulted in a reduction in sensitivity to activity within the 
amygdala. It is possible that, with more comprehensive amygdala coverage, a more valid 
representation of amygdala activity would have emerged. Nonetheless, the overall results 
demonstrating activating effects of threatening emotional stimuli on the amygdala in our 
participants suggests that, to some extent, the methodology used in the current investigation was 
adequate. 
4.3 LIMITATIONS 
In addition to the limitations noted in the previous sections, our findings should be 
interpreted with caution in light of several other constraints. Most relevant is the limited 
variability in the SES indicators within the study sample. Participants in the current investigation 
were recruited from a common geographic location (southwestern Pennsylvania), and were 
predominantly middle-aged, white, and relatively well-educated. The ability to determine valid 
SES-related variation in amygdala reactivity and attentional bias scores was likely affected by 
the sample’s limited range of socioeconomic status. The current sample was highly educated, 
with 80% of participants having earned at least a Bachelor’s degree and only 6% of participants 
reporting their highest educational achievement as being a high school diploma. In contrast, 
approximately 23% of the current U.S. population are college graduates (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). According to recent statistics, approximately 45% of U.S. households report incomes 
equal or greater than $50,000 per year (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), whereas 70% of participants 
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in our sample reported being at or above this income level. Only 11% of study participants 
reported incomes of less than $25,000 per year. Together, the distributions of income and 
education indicate the absence of socioeconomic disadvantage in any significant proportion of 
the current sample. The inclusion of participants across a broader range of age, ethnic diversity, 
and socioeconomic standing may have resulted in a more valid characterization of individuals’ 
responses to threat.  
The comprehensiveness of the SES measures used in this investigation also bears 
consideration. Although education and income are widely used indices of SES, the inclusion of 
an occupational indicator might have more thoroughly encompassed additional dimensions of 
SES. In addition, the inclusion of a community SES measure could have served as a more precise 
indicator of the chronic stress hypothesized to play a role in linking SES to sensitization toward 
potential threats.   
The inconsistent results between samples in the dot probe literature are also cause for 
concern, as is the lack of information regarding reliability of the task with various populations. 
To date, two investigations have reported poor reliability for the original dot probe task 
(Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009), though both studies used nonclinical samples of university 
students. In contrast, much of the literature supporting use of the dot probe for detecting bias for 
threat derives from studies of clinically anxious populations. Considering these inconsistencies, 
the inclusion of additional measures of attentional allocation, such as the Modified Stroop task, 
may have been a beneficial addition to the study. Also, participants may demonstrate attentional 
biases to more specific stimuli than the generic facial expressions used here, and it may be noted 
that some researchers employ verbal or visual stimuli that individuals self-identify as most 
relevant to their perceptions of threat (Amir et al., 2009).  
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In sum, results from the present study must be considered preliminary, as few studies 
have similarly examined the relationship between socioeconomic status and threat-related 
responses. Thus, findings must be replicated in future investigations before firm conclusions can 
be drawn regarding the significance of social status in explaining individual differences in 
attentional bias toward threat. Despite these shortcomings, however, our findings provide initial 
(albeit quite limited) evidence that heightened neurobiological responses to threat may be 
associated with lower SES. 
4.4 ATTENTION TO THREAT, SES, AND DISORDERS OF NEGATIVE 
AFFECT 
The aim of this investigation was to test for the existence of a relationship between SES and 
attention toward threatening stimuli. The conceptual basis for the current study was, in part, 
aimed at evaluating whether this association might operate as a link between social status and 
disorders of negative affect. However, in light of the limited findings in the current study, the 
association between lower social status and heightened risk for mood disorders may operate via a 
pathway separate from what was hypothesized here. Several potential mechanisms that may link 
social status to disorders of negative affect are discussed in this section.  
It is possible that social threats do play a role in linking SES to disorders of depression 
and anxiety, albeit in a different manner than the social information processing mechanism 
hypothesized here. Children growing up in lower SES families experience more threatening and 
uncontrollable life events, such as family dissolution and household moves (Bradley & 
Whiteside-Mansell, 1997, Gad & Johnson 1980), and the chronic strain associated with 
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persistent economic hardship and familial instability may contribute to diminished self-esteem 
and a low sense of personal control (Amato & Zuo 1992, Dohrenwend, 1990, Pearlin et al. 
1981). Lower childhood SES has been associated with development of a pessimistic explanatory 
style (Finkelstein et al., 2007) suggesting that cognitive patterns linked to social origins may be 
carried throughout the life course. Some evidence indicates that these cognitive tendencies may 
operate as mediators of the relationship between SES and depression/anxiety. Deardorff, 
Gonzales, and Sandler (2003) found that generalized perceptions of control partially mediated a 
relationship between stressful events and depression in inner-city adolescents and children, and 
Chou and Chi (2001) showed that sense of personal control similarly mediated a relationship 
between recently experienced stressful life events and depression.  
Speculation for a direct biological link between SES and disorders of negative affect 
stems from substantial evidence documenting an inverse relationship between SES and health, 
with individuals lower in SES experiencing higher rates of all-cause morbidity and mortality 
than individuals of higher social position. Considering the known links between negative affect 
and several medical illnesses, including diabetes, coronary artery disease, stroke, cancer, and 
Parkinson's disease (Anda et al., 1993; Barefoot &  Schroll, 1996; Cassano & Fava,  2002; 
Kubzansky et al., 1997), it is possible that physical illness may play a role in the higher 
prevalence of depression and anxiety in lower SES groups. Also, considerable evidence supports 
a relationship between social status and health-impairing behaviors, including smoking (Adler, 
Boyce, Chesney, Folkman, & Syme, 1993; Bailis, Segall, Mahon, Chipperfield, & Dunn, 2001; 
Connolly & Kesson, 1996; Zang & Wynder, 1998), increased alcohol consumption (Bailis et al., 
2001), lack of exercise (Adler et al., 1993; Ford et al., 1991; Evenson et al., 2002) and obesity 
(Sobal & Stunkard, 1989), behaviors which have been linked to heightened risk of affective 
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disorders (Boden, Fergusson,  & Horwood, 2010; Merikangas & Gelernter, 1990; Nurnberger, 
Foroud, Flury, Meyer, & Wiegand, 2002;  Teychenne, Ball, & Salmon, 2010; Onyike et al., 
2003). In addition, low SES individuals are more frequently exposed to pathogens and 
carcinogens (Adler et al., 1993), and some evidence indicates associations between exposure to 
hazardous chemicals and depression (Stallones & Beseler, 2002; Reif et al., 2003). Finally, 
evidence indicates that members of lower socioeconomic status groups use preventive health 
services less frequently (Adler et al., 1993) and tend to underuse or delay mental health treatment 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999) than do those of higher SES. Hence, 
physical illness, unhealthy behaviors, hazardous environmental conditions, and lack of treatment 
and/or preventative resources may serve as key links between SES and disorders of negative 
affect. 
4.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Despite the lack of support for our study hypotheses, the challenge of addressing socioeconomic 
disparities in mental health remains an important concern, and additional studies are needed to 
address limitations of available research. Prior evidence suggests that neuroimaging studies 
remain a fruitful area for continued study of the association between SES and negative affect. 
Socioeconomic disadvantage in children is associated with delayed development of the 
prefrontal cortex, which may  result in later neurocognitive deficits (D'Angiulli, Herdman, 
Stapells, & Hertzman, 2008) that could, in turn, confer disadvantages in educational abilities and 
attainments. Slavich et al. (2010) noted that increases in tumor necrosis factor-alpha, in response 
to exposure to a social stressor, were associated with heightened activity in the dorsal anterior 
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cingulate cortex and anterior insula, brain regions that have previously been associated with 
processing rejection-related distress and negative affect (Slavich, Way, Eisenberger, & Taylor, 
2010). Lower subjective SES, independent of conventional SES measures, has been associated 
with with reduced gray matter volume in the perigenual area of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC), a brain region involved in emotional experience and the regulation of behavioral and 
physiological reactivity to stress (Gianaros et al., 2007). Also, in addition to measuring the 
activation and/or volume of specific brain structures, the use of functional connectivity analysis 
may shed additional light on whether interactions between neuronal systems differ on the basis 
of social status. Future studies using neuroimaging techniques should prospectively investigate 
the role of both childhood and adulthood SES, including the role of community SES, on 
structural and functional brain alternations. Studies incorporating larger, more diverse samples 
are warranted. Prospective studies that include multiple assessments of SES, biological factors, 
and psychosocial variables will be important to address issues of timing and causality. 
As evidence accumulates regarding the specific causes of social disparities in mental 
health disorders, research regarding interventions targeting those of lower socioeconomic 
standing remains an important strategy for reducing these inequalities. In addition to behavioral 
and cognitive therapeutic strategies and pharmacologic interventions, new methods for treating 
depression and anxiety are necessary. Despite the lack of findings relating SES to selective 
attention to threat, recent work using a modified version of the dot-probe task for the treatment 
of anxiety disorders make this task worthy of further study. Through repeated exposure to 
emotional stimuli (e.g. fearful or angry facial expressions) cognitive behavioral modification 
(CBM) is designed to alter a specific pattern of processing selectivity. Amir, Beard, Burns, and 
Bomyea (2009) reported the success of an extended CBM program, designed to reduce 
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attentional bias to threat, in attenuating the symptoms of GAD, and Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, 
and Timpano (2009) presented similar results in participants with generalized social anxiety 
disorder.  
Vulnerability to mood disorders is most likely a product of a complex interaction of 
individual and environmental factors. Social cognitive resources, by influencing how events are 
perceived, may exacerbate or ameliorate the behavioral and physiological responses to stress that 
lead to social gradients in mental health.  However, although individual therapeutic interventions 
to manage mental health issues are worthy of continued study, psychosocial resources alone are 
unlikely to resolve issues of mental health disparities. Many researchers argue that attention 
should be directed toward fundamental causes of status-based differences in mental health, 
including inequitable distribution of wealth, restricted access to quality education, and 
concentrated poverty (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). Recent work emphasizes promoting cleaner and 
safer living environments (Vlahov & Galea, 2002), improving access to quality medical and 
mental health care for disadvantaged groups (Weech-Maldonado, Dreachslin, & Dansky, 2002), 
and reducing societal income inequalities (Kaplan, 2000). Risk-stratification based on 
socioeconomic position may enable health care professionals to target these interventions where 
they are needed most. School programs may promote resilience to stressful social events by 
incorporating components to reduce pessimism and increase optimism (Gillham & Reivich, 
1999) or to minimize cognitive biases (Chen & Matthews, 2001) possibly reducing the 
psychological toll of socioeconomic disadvantage. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics for all participants. 
         Variable  Mean (SD) or % 
Sex (% female)             41 
Race (% white)             87 
Age (years)          42.1 (7.8) 
Married (%)             56 
Smoker (% current)             12 
Subjective SES (range 2 – 10)          6.2 (1.6) 
Years School (9 – 24)         17.1 (2.7) 
Family Income (1 – 15)          7.1 (3.2) 
Mother’s S-SES (2 – 10) 5.7(1.8) 
Father’s S-SES (2 – 10) 5.7(1.9) 
Mother’s Education (0 - 9) 3.6 (2.2) 
Father’s Education (0 - 9) 4.1 (2.8) 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded 
as: 1 = < $10,000; 2 = $10,000-14,999; 3 = $15,000-24,999; 4 = $25,000-34,999; 5 = $35,000-49,999; 6 = $50,000-
64,999; 7 = $65,000-79,999; 8 = $80,000-94,999; 9 = $95,000-109,999; 10 = $110,000-124,999; 11 = $125,000-
139,999; 12 = $140,000-154,999; 13 = $155,000-169,999; 14 = $170,000-185,000; 15 = > $185,000. Subjective 
SES (S-SES): Individual's ranking of self in comparison to others in the U.S. - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom of ladder, 
people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off).  Mother's and Father's S-SES: 
Participant ranking of PARENT'S socio-economic status (U.S. comparison),during childhood/adolescence - Scale 1-
10 (1=bottom of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off). Mother/Father 
education level achieved/completed before subject turned 18 yoa:  (0 = no H.S. diploma, 1 = GED, 2 = H.S. 
diploma, 3 = Tech training, 4 = Some college, no degree, 5 = AS, 6 = BS, 7 = MS, 8 = MD/PhD 9 = unknown).  
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Table 2. Correlations between participants' demographic characteristics and socioeconomic 
 indices. 
 Sex 
  r 
Race 
  r 
          Age 
r 
Subjective SES  -.115 -.261** .039 
Years School  -.017 -.182* .106 
Family Income  -.090 -.198* .187* 
Composite SES -.068 -.239** .185* 
Mother’s S-SES             -.120             -.037            -.017 
Father’s S-SES              -.111             -.055            -.195* 
Mother’s Ed. Level            -.291**             -.090            -.195* 
Father’s Ed. Level             -.328**             -.212*            -.215* 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded 
as: 1 = < $10,000; 2 = $10,000-14,999; 3 = $15,000-24,999; 4 = $25,000-34,999; 5 = $35,000-49,999; 6 = $50,000-
64,999; 7 = $65,000-79,999; 8 = $80,000-94,999; 9 = $95,000-109,999; 10 = $110,000-124,999; 11 = $125,000-
139,999; 12 = $140,000-154,999; 13 = $155,000-169,999; 14 = $170,000-185,000; 15 = > $185,000. Composite 
SES: re-standardized mean of z-score values of individual’s years of education and family income of the two index 
variables for each individual.  Subjective SES (S-SES): Individual's ranking of self in comparison to others in the 
U.S. - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off).  
Mother's and Father's S-SES: Participant ranking of PARENT'S socio-economic status (U.S. comparison),during 
childhood/adolescence - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who 
are the best off). Mother/Father education level achieved/completed before subject turned 18 y.o.:  (0 = no H.S. 
diploma, 1 = GED, 2 = H.S. diploma, 3 = Tech training, 4 = Some college, no degree, 5 = AS, 6 = BS, 7 = MS, 8 = 
MD/PhD 9 = unknown).  
 
*P < .05, **P < .01, † = point biserial correlation 
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Table 3. Relationships between all indicators of socioeconomic status. 
 
Years 
Education 
 
         r 
Family 
Income 
 
         r 
Composite 
SES 
 
r 
Subjective 
SES 
 
r 
Mother 
S-SES 
 
        r 
Father 
S-SES 
 
           r 
Mother’s Ed. 
Level 
 
r 
Father’s 
Ed. Level 
 
          r 
Years Education           1        
Family Income  .265** 1       
Composite SES  .784** .806**          1      
Subjective SES  .431** .508** .591**          1     
Mother’s S-SES  .313** -.030 .173 .252**         1    
Father S-SES  .308** .063 .230** .293** .865**         1   
Mother’s Ed. Level  .288** .278** .357** .294** .358** .364** 1  
Father’s Ed. Level  .265** .302** .358** .168 .412** .490**           .652** 1 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 = < $10,000; 2 = $10,000-14,999; 3 = $15,000-24,999; 4 
= $25,000-34,999; 5 = $35,000-49,999; 6 = $50,000-64,999; 7 = $65,000-79,999; 8 = $80,000-94,999; 9 = $95,000-109,999; 10 = $110,000-124,999; 11 = $125,000-139,999; 12 = 
$140,000-154,999; 13 = $155,000-169,999; 14 = $170,000-185,000; 15 = > $185,000. Composite SES: re-standardized mean of z-score values of individual’s years of education 
and family income. of the two index variables for each individual.  Subjective SES (S-SES): Individual's ranking of self in comparison to others in the U.S. - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom 
of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off).  Mother's and Father's S-SES: Participant ranking of of PARENT'S socio-economic status 
(U.S. comparison),during childhood/adolescence - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off). Mother/Father 
education level achieved/completed before subject turned 18 yoa:  (0 = no H.S. diploma, 1 = GED, 2 = H.S. diploma, 3 = Tech training, 4 = Some college, no degree, 5 = AS, 6 = 
BS, 7 = MS, 8 = MD/PhD 9 = unknown).  
 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 4. Intercorrelations of attentional bias scores. 
 Anger Bias Score 
r 
Fear Bias Score 
r 
Happy Bias Score 
r 
Anger Bias Score 1 ----------- ----------- 
Fear Bias Score   0.231** 1 ----------- 
Happy Bias Score   0.104 0.182
* 1 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 5. Relationship of covariates and continuous SES indices with attentional bias scores. 
Variable Bias Score 
 
r (Pearson) 
 
            Anger                                      Fear                                Happy 
Sex (% female)  -0.16
†
 0.01
†
 -0.02
†
 
Race (% white)  0.20*
†
 0.10
†
 -0.01
†
 
Age (years) 0.06    0.09     -0.05 
Subjective SES  -0.11    0.03      0.09 
Years School  0.09    0.13      0.11 
Family Income  -0.01    0.08     -0.10 
Composite SES -0.01    0.10      0.13 
Mother’s S-SES 0.08    0.03     -0.06 
Father’s S-SES -0.05    0.01     -0.03 
Mother’s Education Level -0.06   -0.01     -0.02 
Father’s Education Level -0.02   -0.12      0.03 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 = < $10,000; 2 = $10,000-14,999; 3 = $15,000-24,999; 4 
= $25,000-34,999; 5 = $35,000-49,999; 6 = $50,000-64,999; 7 = $65,000-79,999; 8 = $80,000-94,999; 9 = $95,000-109,999; 10 = $110,000-124,999; 11 = $125,000-139,999; 12 = 
$140,000-154,999; 13 = $155,000-169,999; 14 = $170,000-185,000; 15 = > $185,000. Composite SES: re-standardized mean of z-score values of individual’s years of education 
and family income. of the two index variables for each individual.  Subjective SES (S-SES): Individual's ranking of self in comparison to others in the U.S. - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom 
of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off).  Mother's and Father's S-SES: Participant ranking of of PARENT'S socio-economic status 
(U.S. comparison),during childhood/adolescence - Scale 1-10 (1=bottom of ladder, people who are the worst off, 10=top of ladder, people who are the best off). Mother/Father 
education level achieved/completed before subject turned 18 yoa:  (0 = no H.S. diploma, 1 = GED, 2 = H.S. diploma, 3 = Tech training, 4 = Some college, no degree, 5 = AS, 6 = 
BS, 7 = MS, 8 = MD/PhD 9 = unknown).  
 
*P < .05, **P < .01, † = point biserial correlation 
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Table 6. Linear regression analyses, covarying for age, sex, and race, examining relationships between dichotomized family income and attentional  
bias scores. 
   Anger Bias Score Fear Bias Score Happy Bias Score 
B SE B p B SE B p B SE B p 
Age .318 .371 .393 .430 .660 .516 -.256 .595 .667 
Sex -10.899 5.780 .062 -.430 10.292 .967 -.603 9.270 .948 
Race 8.778 4.928 .077 10.626 8.776 .228 -1.040 7.904 .896 
Low vs. High Family  
Income  
 
-13.870 7.843   .079 18.293 13.966 .193 
  
 
-10.435 12.578 .408 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 (low) = < $35,000, 2 (high) = ≥ $35,000 
 
Table 7. Linear regression analyses, covarying for age, sex, and race, examining relationships between dichotomized education and attentional bias 
scores. 
 Anger Bias Score Fear Bias Score Happy Bias Score 
B SE B p B SE B p B SE B p 
Age .312 .378 .412 .511 .671 .448 -.373 .600 .535 
Sex -11.197 5.849 .058 -.448 10.381 .966 -.191 9.286 .984 
Race 10.091 4.909 .042 8.334 8.712 .341 .814 7.793 .917 
Low vs. High Education  -6.015 7.885 .447 -1.629 13.993 .908 10.225 12.517 .414 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Education coded as: 1 (low) = < Associate’s Degree, 2 (high) = ≥ Associate’s degree or higher. 
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Table 8. Significant BOLD fMRI responses in the amygdala for all contrasts – whole brain peak level. 
 
Contrast    MNI coordinates (x, y, z)   Cluster size   T score  P value 
 
Anger > Shapes 
L. amygdala    -24, -6, -18     39   10.26   0.001 
R. amygdala    22, -2, -20     38   10.78   0.001 
Fear  > Shapes 
L. amygdala    -22, -2, -20     39   9.56   0.001 
R. amygdala    24, -2, -20    38   10.37   0.001 
Happy > Shapes 
L. amygdala    -26, -2, -20    39   7.19   0.001 
R. amygdala    No suprathreshold clusters 
Neutral > Shapes 
L. amygdala    -28, -2, -20     39   3.87  0.001 
R. amygdala    22, 0, -18     38   8.31   0.001 
 Anger > Neutral 
L. amygdala    -26, -4, -20     34   3.23   0.001 
R. amygdala    26, -2, -20     23  3.40   0.002 
Anger > Happy 
L. amygdala    No suprathreshold clusters 
R. amygdala    28, 0, -20     26   2.84   0.003 
Fear > Neutral 
L. amygdala    -24, -4, -18     28   3.54   0.001 
R. amygdala    26, -6, -18     38  4.70   0.001 
Fear > Happy 
L. amygdala    -28, -4, -18    30  2.06   0.021 
R. amygdala    24, -2, -20     21  2.94   0.002 
Neutral > Happy 
L. amygdala    No suprathreshold clusters 
R. amygdala    No suprathreshold clusters 
 
 
Note. Coordinates represent voxels in the amygdala with the most significant magnitude and spatial extent. 
All reported statistical values are derived from a second-level random effects analysis using an uncorrected threshold of P < 0.05. L amygdala coordinates pre-set at  -26, 0 ,-20; 
right amygdala coordinates pre-set at 24, -2, -20, extent threshold = 0, 10 mm amygdala sphere  
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Table 9. Intercorrelations between right and left hemisphere amygdala activation values for all affective conditions in contrast with reactivity to  
shapes.  
 
L Anger 
r 
R Anger 
r 
L Fear 
r 
R Fear 
r 
L Happy 
r 
R Happy 
r 
L Neutral 
r 
R Neutral 
r 
L Anger  1 - - - - - - - 
R Anger  .553** 1 - - - - - - 
L Fear  .291** .150          1 - - - - - 
R Fear  .203* .577** .521**         1 - - - - 
L Happy  .330** .311** .591** .447**          1 - - - 
R Happy  .267** .573** .355** .668** .627**           1 - - 
L Neutral  .414** .308** .391** .309** .278** .180* 1 - 
R Neutral  .205* .459** .260** .538** .253** .515**         .548** 1 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 10. Intercorrelations between significant right and left hemisphere amygdala activation values for threatening stimuli in contrast with reactivity 
to neutral facial expressions. 
 L Anger 
r 
R Anger 
r 
L Fear 
r 
R Fear 
r 
L Anger         1 - -        - 
R Anger  .409**        1        -        - 
L Fear  .359** .095 1 - 
R Fear  .190* .511** .487**        1 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
  
Table 11. Intercorrelations between significant right and left hemisphere amygdala activation values for threatening stimuli in contrast with happy 
facial expressions. 
 
R Anger 
r 
L Fear 
r 
R Fear 
r 
R Anger  1 - - 
L Fear         .046             1 - 
R Fear         .333**         .472** 1 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 12. Comparison of right and left amygdala activation values for each affective condition > shapes. 
 Right 
Mean (SD) 
Left 
Mean (SD) 
Statistic p 
Anger .65 (.77) .39 (.55) t126 = 4.49 .000 
Fear .62 (.75) .39 (.61) t126 = 3.70 .000 
Happy .53 (.69) .38 (.53) t126 = 3.03 .003 
Neutral .42 (.67) .24 (.59) t126 = 3.49 .001 
 
Table 13. Comparison of amygdala activation values between contrast conditions. 
 >Shapes 
Mean (SD) 
>Neutral 
Mean (SD) 
Statistic p 
Left Anger  .39 (.55) .14 (,61) t126 = 4.65 .000 
Right Anger .65 (.77) .21 (.84) t126 = 6.92 .000 
Left Fear .39 (.61) .16 (.60) t126 = 4.74 .000 
Right Fear .62 (.75) .19 (.69) t126 = 7.14 .000 
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Table 14. Relationship of demographic characteristics and right amygdala reactivity values. 
Variable Right Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
r  (Pearson) 
   Shapes                    Neutral                     Happy 
Right Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
r  (Pearson) 
  Shapes                Neutral                   Happy 
Sex (% female) -0.03 † -0.01 † 0.06 † 0.04† 0.07† 0.16† 
Race (% white) -0.17* † -0.13 † -0.11 † -0.07† 0.01† 0.02† 
Age 0.02  0.04  -0.06  0.09 0.14† 0.05† 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. 
*P < .05, **P < .01, † = point biserial correlation 
 
Table 15. Relationship of demographic characteristics and right amygdala reactivity values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. 
*P < .05, **P < .01, † = point biserial correlation 
 
 
 
Variable Left Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
             r  (Pearson) 
   Shapes                         Neutral                  
Left Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
r  (Pearson) 
        Shapes                Neutral                   Happy 
Sex (% female) 0.10† 0.08† 0.07† 0.07† 0.20*
† 
Race (% white) -0.10† -0.02† 0.04† 0.10† 0.07
† 
Age -0.16    0.03         -0.06          0.05 -0.04 
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Table 16. Relationship between continuous SES indices and right amygdala activation to angry facial expressions.  
    Variable Right Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
                     r  (Pearson) 
          Shapes              Neutral                 Happy 
Subjective SES  0.03  -0.02  0.08  
Years School  0.02  -0.01  0.06  
Family Income  0.08  0.11  0.15  
Composite SES 0.07  0.07  0.13  
Mother’s S-SES -0.02  -0.15  -0.06  
Father’s S-SES  -0.01  -0.11  0.04  
Mother’s Education Level .073  -.049  -.012  
Father’s Education Level  0.05  -0.03  -0.02  
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 17. Linear regression - association between dichotomized income and right amygdala activation to angry facial expressions.  
 Right Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
 
        Shapes                              Neutral                           Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
.006 .009 .546 .005 .010 .630 -.007 .007 .330 
Sex 
 
.036 .143 .803 .044 .158 .783 .188 .110 .089 
Race 
 
-.239 .120 .049 -.107 .133 .423 -.127 .092 .170 
Low vs. High  
Family Income 
-.200 .193 .302 .063 .214 .769 .122 .148 .412 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 (low) = < $35,000, 2 (high) = ≥ $35,000 
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Table 18. Linear regression - association between dichotomized education and right amygdala activation to angry facial expressions. 
 Right Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
         Shapes                            Neutral                            Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
.004 .009 .669 .006 .010 .554 -.006 .007 .405 
Sex 
 
.044 .143 .758 .041 .158 .794 .182 .110 .099 
Race 
 
-.223 .122 .071 -.129 .135 .340 -.138 .093 .143 
Low vs. High 
Education 
.035 .194 .857 -.154 .214 .474 -.031 .149 .837 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Education coded as: 1 (low) = < Associate’s Degree, 2 (high) = ≥ Associate’s degree or higher. 
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Table 19. Relationship between continuous SES indices and right amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions. 
Variable   Right Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
                r  (Pearson) 
       Shapes             Neutral             Happy 
Subjective SES  -.004 -.010 .044 
Years School  .093 .133 .160 
Family Income  -.020 .037 .000 
Composite SES .044 .105 .098 
Mother’s S-SES .132 .004 .113 
Father’s S-SES  .066 -.034 .120 
Mother’s Education Level .265** .112 .180* 
Father’s Education Level  .142 .024 .078 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 20. Linear regression - association between dichotomized income and right amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions. 
 Right Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
 
                Shapes                                Neutral                                Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
.013 .009 .165 .013 .008 .113 .000 .006 .959 
Sex 
 
.002 .140 .990 .041 .129 .749 .169 .094 .077 
Race 
 
-.130 .118 .273 -.021 .108 .847 .021 .079 .795 
Low vs. High  
Family Income  
-.376 .189 .050 -.172 .173 .323 -.036 .127 .777 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 (low) = < $35,000, 2 (high) = ≥ $35,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 99 
Table 21. Linear regression - association between dichotomized education and right amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions 
 Right Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
 
                Shapes                          Neutral                            Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
.009 .009 .317 .012 .008 .165 .000 .006 .950 
Sex 
 
.017 .142 .902 .048 .129 .708 .170 .094 .073 
Race 
 
-.087 .121 .475 .003 .110 .980 .036 .080 .652 
Low vs. High 
Education 
.176 .193 .364 .112 .174 .522 .113 .128 .379 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Education coded as: 1 (low) = < Associate’s Degree, 2 (high) = ≥ Associate’s degree or higher. 
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Table 22. Relationship between continuous SES indices and left amygdala activation to angry facial expressions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Left Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
r  (Pearson) 
             Shapes                     Neutral                  
Subjective SES  -.057 -.086 
Years School  -.013 .003 
Family Income  -.012 .043 
Composite SES -.015 .030 
Mother’s S-SES .017 -.085 
Father’s S-SES  .010 -.059 
Mother’s Education Level -.038 -.074 
Father’s Education Level  .014 -.042 
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Table 23. Linear regression – association between dichotomized income and left amygdala activation to angry facial expressions. 
 Left Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
                 Shapes                                Neutral               
Variable B SE p B SE p 
Age -.008 .007 .237 .001 .008 .854 
Sex .135 .103 .194 .089 .116 .444 
Race -.080 .086 .359 -.029 .098 .767 
Low vs. High  
Family Income  
-.109 .139 .435 -.054 .157 .732 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 (low) = < $35,000, 2 (high) = ≥ $35,000 
Table 24. Linear regression – association between dichotomized education and left amygdala activation to angry facial expressions 
         Left Amygdala Activation to Angry Faces 
    Shapes                             Neutral               
Variable B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
-.009 .007 .193 .001 .007 .875 
Sex 
 
.139 .103 .179 .092 .116 .430 
Race 
 
-.076 .088 .390 -.032 .099 .748 
Low vs. High 
Education 
-.021 .140 .882 -.050 .157 .750 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Education coded as: 1 (low) = < Associate’s Degree, 2 (high) = ≥ Associate’s degree or higher. 
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Table 25. Relationship between continuous SES indices and left amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions. 
Variable Left Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
r  (Pearson) 
     Shapes              Neutral               Happy 
Subjective SES  -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 
Years School  -0.18* -0.20* -0.09 
Family Income  -0.20* -0.12 -0.10 
Composite SES -0.23** -0.20* -0.12 
Mother’s S-SES 0.15 0.01 0.02 
Father’s S-SES  0.12 0.02 0.03 
Mother’s Education Level 0.07 0.03 -0.09 
Father’s Education Level  0.03 -0.03 -0.06 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
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Table 26. Linear regression – association between dichotomized income and left amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions. 
 Left Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
 
     Shapes                             Neutral                             Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
-.003 .007 .635 .004 .007 .609 -.006 .005 .246 
Sex 
 
.092 .113 .417 .072 .111 .519 .187 .075 .014 
Race 
 
.039 .094 .681 .080 .093 .392 .089 .063 .160 
Low vs. High  
Family Income  
-.439 .152 .004 -.335 .150 .027 -.037 .101 .712 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Family Income (per year) coded as: 1 (low) = < $35,000, 2 (high) = ≥ $35,000 
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Table 27. Linear regression – association between dichotomized income and left amygdala activation to fearful facial expressions. 
 Left Amygdala Activation to Fear Faces 
 
     Shapes                             Neutral                              Happy 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Age 
 
-.007 .007 .380 .002 .007 .824 -.006 .005 .187 
Sex 
 
.111 .116 .342 .087 .113 .444 .188 .075 .013 
Race 
 
.057 .099 .565 .085 .096 .382 .104 .064 .103 
Low vs. High 
Education  
-.063 .158 .688 -.127 .153 .409 .109 .101 .282 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. Education coded as: 1 (low) = < Associate’s Degree, 2 (high) = ≥ Associate’s degree or higher. 
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Table 28. Linear regression – association between mother’s education and right amygdala activation to fearful faces. 
        Right Amygdala  
       Fear vs. Shapes 
                Right Amygdala  
                 Fear vs. Happy  
B SE B P B SE B P 
Step 1       
Mother’s Education  .079 .030 .010 .042 .020 .041 
Covariate Adjusted 
 
      
    Age .010 .009 .240 .000 .006 .951 
     Sex .136 .138 .326 .263 .093 .006 
     Race -.045 .113 .691 .019 .076 .800 
Step 2      
Mother’s Education  .105 .031 .001 .060  .021  .005 
B reflects the estimated difference in amygdala activation associated with a 1 SD increase in Education.  
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. 
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Table 29. Linear regression - Predictors of left amygdala activation to fear faces 
 Left Amygdala  
Fear > Shapes 
Left Amygdala  
Fear > Neutral  
Left Amygdala  
Fear > Happy 
 
B 
 
SE B P 
      
B 
   
SE B 
     
P 
   
B E B 
    
P 
Model 1a          
Years School .112 .056 .046 .120 .054 .028 .036 .037 .341 
          
Model 2a          
Family Income .118 053 .028 .073 .052 .167 .041 .036 .254 
          
Model 3a          
Composite SES  -.147 .055 .008 -.122 .054 .025 -.049 .037 .187 
 
Model 1b 
         
Age .005 .007 .521 .003 .007 639 .006 .005 .254 
  
Sex .098 .115 .394 .073 
 
.112 .515 .186 .075 .014 
   
Race .028 .098 .777 .059 
 
.095 .538 .084 .064 .192 
          
Years School .104 .058 .073 -.116 .056 .041 .020 .038 .592 
 
Model 2b 
         
 Age .003 .008 .690 .003 .007 .642 -.005 .005 .279 
 
 Sex .075 .116 .522 .064 .114 .575 .183 .076 .017 
 
 Race .018 .099 .858 .071 .097 .469 .084 .065 .194 
          
Family Income  -.018 .057 .060 -.067 .056 .233 -.005 .037 .676 
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Model 3b 
     Age -.002 .008 .788 .005 .007 .479 -.005 .005 .303 
 
     Sex .071 .115 .538 .052 .112 .642 .182 .076 .018 
     Race -.005 .099 .963 .040 .097 .679 .079 .065 .227 
Composite SES  -.142 .059 .018 -.122 .058 .037 -.024 .039 .540 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. 
 
 
Table 30. Nonlinear regression - predictors of amygdala activation to fearful faces.  
 Right Amygdala 
Fear vs. Shapes 
Right Amygdala 
Fear vs. Happy 
B SE B P B SE B    P 
Quadratic Term       
Mother’s Education  .106 .068 .120 .031 .047 .503 
Cubic Term      
Mother’s Education  -.061 .052 .242 .005 .036 .894 
B reflects the estimated difference in amygdala activation associated with a 1 SD increase in Education.  
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American.  
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Table 31. Nonlinear regression - predictors of left amygdala activation to fear faces. 
DV: Left Amygdala  
Fear > Shapes 
Left Amygdala  
Fear > Neutral  
Left Amygdala  
Fear > Happy 
 
B 
 
SE B P 
        
   B 
 
SE B 
   
   P 
    
   B 
 
SE B 
    
 P 
Quadratic Term          
          
Years School -.028 .038 .454 -.031 .036 .400 -.039 .025 .116 
          
Family Income .066 .037 .080 .061 .037 .104 -.010 .025 .702 
          
Composite SES  .042 .038 .271 .037 .038 .324 -.009 .026 .741 
          
Cubic Term          
          
Years School .032 .029 .266 .061 .028 .030 .028 .019 .143 
 
Family Income  -.030 .032 .351 -.067 -.020 .538 .008 .022 .711 
Composite SES  -.011 .027 .672 .025 .026 .347 .003 .018 .849 
Sex coded 1 = Male, 2 = Female. Race coded 1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American. 
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Table 32. Correlations between attentional bias scores and amygdala reactivity values to threatening facial expressions. 
 
 
L  Anger 
 > Shapes 
L Anger > 
 Neutral 
R Anger 
  > Shapes 
R Anger 
 > Neutral 
R Anger 
 >  Happy 
L Fear >     
Shapes 
L Fear  > 
   Neutral 
L Fear  > 
    Happy 
R Fear  > 
   Shapes 
R Fear  > 
    Neutral 
R Fear > 
   Happy 
Anger Bias  
(ms) 
.104 
 
-.120 .012 -.108 -.052 .191* -.041 .100 .087 -.024 .113 
Fear Bias  
(ms) 
.092 .036 .112 .033 -.024 .037 .014 -.046 .062 .007 -.094 
Happy Bias  
(ms) 
.102 -.003 .021 .095 .235** -.233** -.278** .011 -.174 -.087 -.018 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
 
 
Table 33. Correlations between attentional bias scores and amygdala reactivity values to happy and neutral facial expressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*P < .05, **P < .01 
 
L  Happy > Shapes R  Happy > Shapes L  Neutral > Shapes R  Neutral > Shapes 
Anger Bias .249** .063 .232** .125 
Fear Bias .135 .164 .020 .049 
Happy Bias  -.296** -.241** .097 -.102 
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